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The Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 established a new program, known
as Medicare Part D, to provide Medicare beneficiaries with insurance coverage for
prescription drugs. The implementation of Part D started on January 1st, 2006. Prior
to Part D, up to 40% of Medicare beneficiaries lacked any insurance coverage for
their expenditures on prescription drugs (Congressional Budget Office (2002)). The
majority of those with coverage faced significant out-of-pocket expenditures. For
instance, Medigap Plan J, which is the best individual drug coverage for seniors,
provides drug coverage up to a cap of $3000. More generous coverage was available
through employer retiree drug benefits, which only 25% of seniors had (McAdams
and Schwarz (2007)). In 2003, 61.6 % of Medicare beneficiaries had annual pre-
scribed drug expenses between $1 and $2,083, while 20.5 % had drug expenses
between $2,084 and $4,723, and 8.4 % spent more than $4,724 on their medications
(Stagnitti (2006)).
The situation changed significantly after the implementation of Medicare Part
D. By June of 2009, more than 60% of Medicare beneficiaries obtained prescrip-
tion drug coverage through a Part D plan in their region, raising the percentage
of beneficiaries with drug coverage to more than 90% (Hargrave et al. (2009a)).
Obtaining drug coverage resulted in significant reductions in out-of-pocket spending
along with increased utilization of prescription drugs by seniors (Schneeweiss et al.
(2009), Ketcham et al. (2010)). In addition, this significant expansion in coverage
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was attained with costs lower than the initial government projections (Duggan et al.
(2008)).
The success of this major public benefit program was accomplished through a
unique design. The program relies substantially on market mechanisms to deliver
the benefit. Unlike coverage of the other Medicare benefits, Part D coverage is
provided entirely through private plans. Part D added a drug coverage component
to Medicare Advantage plans to form Medicare Advantage Part D plans (MAPD).
Medicare Advantage plans are private managed care plans available to Medicare
beneficiaries as an alternative to traditional Fee-for-Service (FFS) Medicare. In
addition to supplementing Medicare Advantage plans, Part D involves the creation of
unique stand-alone drug insurance plans, called Part D Plans (PDPs). The program
provides heavy subsidies to participating plans to protect them against such market
imperfections as adverse selection and moral hazard. The essential philosophy be-
hind this choice of design is that private markets, with enough government subsidy,
could provide, through competition, adequate coverage at low prices. The evidence
so far indicates that this subsidy-competition combination works, at least in the short
run (Duggan et al. (2008), Heiss et al. (2006),Goldman and Joyce (2009)).
The reliance on private markets to deliver this important benefit highlights the
importance of understanding how beneficiaries value different aspects of this ben-
efit. Such understanding is essential for policy makers and regulators in order to
gauge the success of the market in providing beneficiaries with coverage options
that maximize their welfare. This understanding will also be needed to predict the
effects of any future changes in the design of the program, such as changes in the
level of subsidy or the parameters of the standard benefit. Moreover, an accurate
evaluation of consumer preferences allows for a better measurement of the overall
cost-effectiveness of the program.
There are several studies in the literature that use structural modeling tech-
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niques to evaluate preferences of Part D beneficiaries (Keating (2007), Lucarelli
et al. (2008), Heiss et al. (2010), Heiss et al. (2008), Abaluck and Gruber (2009),
Frakt and Pizer (2010)). These studies, however, focus on the first two years of
Part D implementation. The market in this early stage is unlikely to have matured
enough to support any conclusions about the behavior of participants in the long
run. Beneficiaries are likely to have made significant mistakes early on as they were
learning about the market and the complex benefit structure (Abaluck and Gruber
(2009), Heiss et al. (2010), Ketcham et al. (2010)). Industry reports indicate that
plans were experimenting with pricing strategies that are idiosyncratic and may not
represent long run pricing behavior (Simon and Lucarelli (2006)). In addition, the
enrollment period for 2006 extended to the middle of the year, instead of ending
by the beginning of the year as for later years. Conclusions based on behavior in
this environment could potentially misrepresent behavior in future years, when the
market is more established and participants are more informed.
Moreover, the majority of studies in the literature use aggregate plan enroll-
ment data that do not distinguish between low-income-subsidy (LIS) recipients and
non-LIS enrollees. The design of Part D benefit for LIS beneficiaries is consider-
ably different from the benefit for non-LIS enrollees. LIS beneficiaries do not pay
premiums or deductibles, and have coverage in the doughnut hole. They also pay
small copayments. Lastly, and most importantly for demand analysis purposes, the
government facilitates their enrollments by automatically and randomly assigning
them to Part D plans with premiums below a region-specific benchmark. Many
beneficiaries remain in their assigned plans, although they are entitled to switch
to a different plan if they prefer. This random assignment means that observable
enrollment patterns for LIS beneficiaries do not purely represent their active choices,
and, as such, do not reflect their underlying preferences. Therefore, the inclusion
of these enrollment patterns in an overall analysis of demand by Medicare Part D
3
enrollees will result in estimates that do not reflect the preferences of the average
enrollee.
In this study, I avoid these potential problems by modeling demand for stand-
alone Part D plans in the latest year of the program (2009), and by using recently
available data on plan-level LIS enrollment to estimate separate demand systems
for LIS beneficiaries and non-LIS enrollees. In addition, I extend my analysis to
examine the heterogeneity of preference parameters for non-LIS enrollees, and how
that heterogeneity relates to the distribution of consumer characteristics. Lastly, I
use the demand estimates for LIS beneficiaries together with estimates of parameter
heterogeneity to evaluate welfare gains to LIS beneficiaries from an alternative




The Medicare Part D Program
2.1 Overview of the Medicare Part D Program
2.1.1 Benefit Design
The MMA specifies the types of plans and prescription drug benefits that could
be offered to Medicare beneficiaries under Part D. The law specifies two types of
private plans that could be offered by insurance companies and other plan sponsors.
A stand-alone prescription drug plan (PDP) contracts with Medicare for the sole
purpose of providing the drug benefit. On the other hand, a Medicare-Advantage
plan provides comprehensive coverage of all services covered by Medicare including
prescription drugs. CMS defined 34 drug PDP regions, excluding territories, and
each plan has to be offered throughout at least one of the 34 regions. Although
not required by law, each plan generally offers identical benefit packages, except
for premiums and low-income subsidy qualification, in all the regions in which it is
available. In all the years of the program, premiums vary substantially both within
and across regions. Insurers and other plan sponsors can, and commonly do, offer
several stand-alone Part D plans with different levels of benefits in a given area. The
benefits provided by a plan should be at least equal in value to the standard benefit
defined by MMA. The structure of the standard benefit is a follows: enrollees pay
100 percent of their costs until their spending for covered drugs reaches an initial
deductible. Once the deductible is reached, the plan pays 75 percent of the cost and
the enrollee pays the remaining 25 percent, until the combined spending reaches
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the initial coverage limit (ICL). The enrollee enters what is called the doughnut hole,
where she is responsible for 100 percent of the drug cost until total drug spending
reaches catastrophic coverage limit (CCL). For spending above the CCL, the enrollee
pays 5 percent of the cost and the plan pays the rest of the cost but is reimbursed
80 percent of the cost in reinsurance payments from CMS. The deductible, ICL,
and CCL are readjusted each year using the annual percentage increase in average
per capita aggregate expenditures for covered Part D drugs ( table 2.1). Figure
(2.1) shows the structure of the defined standard benefit in 2009. The deductible
for the standard benefit was $295, and the ICL and CCL were $2,700 and $6,154,
respectively (Kaiser Family Foundation (2009)). This amounts to $3,400 of coverage
gap, and a total of $4,350 in true out-of-pocket costs before the beneficiary reaches
the catastrophic coverage zone. Catastrophic coverage limit is defined in terms
of the true out-of-pocket cost, which are the beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket liabilities,
excluding those paid by third parties, such as supplementary employer coverage.
Sponsors may offer two other types of basic coverage (table 2.2): actuarially
equivalent coverage and basic alternative coverage. Plans offering these basic cov-
erage types can vary their benefit design, for instance by reducing or eliminating
deductibles and charging fixed copayment as opposed to the 25 percent coinsurance
of the standard benefit, so long as the share of total spending covered by the plan is
the same as would be paid under the standard benefit. The fourth type of benefit is
called enhanced alternative benefit and it has an overall actuarial value greater than
the standard benefit. Plans offering enhanced coverage have reduced cost-sharing
and some coverage in the doughnut hole. MMA limits subsidies to the portion of a
plan’s benefit that is actuarially equivalent to the standard benefit described above,
which leaves beneficiary completely liable for the cost of the enhanced portion of
any plan’s benefit.
A certain group of medications are specifically excluded from Medicare Part D
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plans and they include certain anti-anxiety and anti-seizure drugs, such as barbitu-
rates and benzodiazepines, most prescription vitamins and minerals, and prescription
drugs used for anorexia, weight loss or weight gain, fertility, cosmetic purposes or
hair growth, and relief of symptoms of cold. Plans could include excluded medica-
tions in their formularies as part of their supplemental benefit that is not subsidized
by Part D.
In March of 2010, Congressed passed comprehensive healthcare reform legisla-
tion that changed the design of Part D benefit (The Henry Kaiser Family Foundation
(2010)). The law phases in coverage for the doughnut hole over the period 2010-
2020. In 2010, seniors reaching the gap will be issued a non-taxable $250 rebate. In
the year 2011, beneficiaries will receive 50% discount from pharmaceutical compa-
nies on their brand-name medications in the doughnut hole. Coverage for generic
drugs is phased in starting 2010, and for brand-name drugs starting 2013. By 2020,
seniors will be covered for 75% of their prescription drug expenditures in the gap.
In addition, the law reduces the catastrophic coverage limit starting 2014.
Figure 2.1: Defined Standard Benefit, 2009. Source: The Henry Keiser Family
Foundation.
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Table 2.1: Part D Parameters for the Defined Standard Benefit:
2006-2009
Parameter 2006 2007 2008 2009
Deductible ($) 250 265 275 295
ICL ($) 2,250 2,400 2,510 2,700
Out-of-Pocket CT ($) 3,600 3,850 4,050 4,350
Total Cost at CT ($) 5,100 5,451.25 5,726.25 6,153.75
a ICL= Initial Coverage Limit. CT = Catastrophic Threshold
Table 2.2: Other Part D Benefit Types.
Benefit Type Deductible Cost Sharing Actuarial Value
Actuarially Equivalent $295 CI or CP = Defined Standard
Basic Alternative ≤ $295 CI or CP = Defined Standard
Extended Alternative ≤ $295 CI or CP > Defined Standard
a CI=Coinsurance. CP=Copay.
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2.1.2 Subsidies to Insurers
The market for stand-alone prescription drug insurance is prone to significant levels
of adverse selection and moral hazard. Individual drug spending is highly predictable
from year to year, which means that plans charging unsubsidized premiums will only
attract those who expect to have drug expenditures that are more than the charged
premium (Pauly and Zeng (2004)). The history of private supplementary insurance
policies (Medigap) that provide prescription drug coverage is a good illustration
of this point. Medigap plans that provided drug coverage charged significantly
higher premiums, principally as a result of higher costs due to adverse selection
(Congressional Budget Office (2002)). The threat of adverse selection is amplified by
the potential for moral hazard and by the effect of competition. Insurance plans in
this context compete to attract healthy enrollees by offering less generous coverage
at a reduced premium. This could potentially lead to the unraveling of the market
as insurers race to the bottom and an increasing portion of beneficiaries is denied
insurance that is welfare enhancing(Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)).
To counteract these forces and ensure a viable market, Part D provides substantial
subsidies to participating insurers. The aim of the subsidy is to lower premiums to an
extent that makes enrollment cost-beneficial to a substantial portion of beneficiaries,
including those with small expected drug expenditures. The subsidy to plans has
several components. The first, called direct subsidy, is a prospective component that
is paid as a capitation amount on behalf of each enrollee. The second component
is a reinsurance subsidy to reimburse plans for 80 percent of an enrollee’s drug ex-
penditures beyond the catastrophic threshold. MMA specifies that the two subsidies
together should cover 74.5 percent of average expected costs of all enrollees in
the basic Part D benefit. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that
catastrophic coverage accounts for 27% of the average total cost of the basic benefit,
which leaves 47.5 percent of the cost to be paid to plans prospectively as direct sub-
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sidies (Congressional Budget Office (2004)). The direct subsidy in turn is adjusted
to reflect differences in risk among enrollees in different plans. This risk adjustment
provides an important additional protection against adverse selection by limiting
plans’ incentives to select healthy enrollees (McAdams and Schwarz (2007), Robst
et al. (2007), Heiss et al. (2010), Congressional Budget Office (2004)). In addition
to the direct and reinsurance subsidies, Part D offers plans protection against excess
business risk that could result from participating in a newly developed market. To
that effect, MMA has established risk corridors whereby the government shares with
insurers a percentage of their overall losses or profits if they exceed a certain level
specified by the law.
2.1.3 Low Income Subsidy
Part D provides a different kind of subsidy to beneficiaries with limited income,
called low income subsidy (LIS). There are two groups of beneficiaries that qualify
for this subsidy(The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2009)). The first group
is entitled to a full subsidy, and includes beneficiaries with income below 135% of
the poverty level and with resources less than $8,100 for an individual or $12,910
for a couple 1. Included in this group are those eligible for full Medicaid coverage,
regardless of their income or assets. Full subsidy beneficiaries pay no premium or
deductible if they join benchmark plans in their region, which are basic benefit plans
with premiums below a weighted average premium in the region. They are also
covered in the doughnut hole and only pay reduced copayment for brand and generic
drugs. The second group is entitled to a partial subsidy, and includes beneficiaries
with income below 150% of the poverty level and with resources less than $12,510
for an individual and $25,010 for a couple. Partial subsidy recipients may pay part
of their own premium and a deductible, depending on their income level, but also
1Asset limits are for the year 2010
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have no coverage gap and pay smaller copayment.
Dual eligibles and those receiving SSI cash assistance are automatically deemed
eligible for Part D low-income subsidy. Those enrolled in a Medicare Saving Program
(MSP), which offers Medicaid assistance with premium and cost-sharing, are also
automatically deemed eligible. However, automatically deemed beneficiaries could
loose their eligibility for the coming year if their deemed status changes before the
middle of the current year. Other low-income Medicare beneficiaries need to apply
for the subsidy and meet the income and resource test. Social security benefits,
veteran benefits, pensions, and annuities are all counted as income. Resources are
defined as assets that are convertible to cash in 20 days or less. Those include
stocks, bonds, and saving and retirement accounts, but principal homes, car, or life
insurance policies are not counted. Applications are done through SSA or state
Medicaid programs, and eligibility determinations are retained for the whole year.
However, recipients have to reapply each year for the subsidy.
To ensure continuity of prescription drug coverage, CMS automatically and ran-
domly assigns low-income subsidy recipients who do not sign up for a plan on their
own to Part D plans with premiums below a region-specific benchmark. Beneficiaries
can enroll in any qualified MAPD or PDP, but they are auto-assigned only to a
qualified PDP. LIS beneficiaries, however, are allowed to switch plans throughout the
year and not only during open enrollment, as is the case for other Part D enrollees.
LIS recipients who choose to enroll in plans with premiums above the benchmark
have to pay the portion of premium above the benchmark. As premiums change
from year to year, some plans lose their LIS qualification and CMS automatically
and randomly reassigns LIS beneficiaries in those plans to other plans in the region
with premiums below the benchmark. Those LIS beneficiaries who signed up for a
plan on their own, or switched plans after being assigned one, are not automatically
reassigned when their plan looses LIS qualification. They are only notified that they
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need to switch another LIS plan if they want to avoid paying any premium.
2.1.4 Plans’ Biddings and Premiums
Each sponsor submits a bid to CMS reflecting its monthly charges during the coming
year for providing each of its proposed plans to a typical Part D eligible. Plans
estimate the average expected cost of their plan (benefits plus administrative cost),
and then subtract expected federal reinsurance payments to come up with their bids
for providing coverage for an enrollee with an average risk profile (Congressional
Budget Office (2004)). Plans offering enhanced benefits must separately identify the
portion of their bid attributable to the basic Part D benefit. CMS guidelines permit
each organization to submit three different bids for plan offerings, as long as those
bids represent meaningful variations and one of the options provides gap coverage
(CMS (2007)).CMS computes a national average bid, using only the portion of bids
attributable to the basic benefit and weighting the bids according to each plans
share of the total Part D population. The average bid for 2007 was $80.43. CMS
multiplies the national average bid by a specified percentage, determined each year,
to compute the base beneficiary premium. For 2007, the percentage is about 34
percent, resulting in a base beneficiary premium of $27.35. This is the monthly
amount beneficiaries would pay to enroll in a plan whose total bid amount was
exactly equal to the average of $80.43. Enrollees joining higher-cost plans must
pay $27.35 plus the difference between the plans bid and the national average bid.
Those joining lower-cost plans pay less than $27.35 (Merlis (2007)). The difference
between the average bid and beneficiary premium is the direct subsidy the CMS pays
to plans. Therefore, the sum of expected reinsurance payment, the direct subsidy,
and the beneficiary premium for each plan equals its total expected costs. To the
extent that plans’ actual costs differed from expectations, the difference could result
in higher or lower federal reinsurance payments and could trigger transfers under
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the risk corridor system (Boards of Trustees (2009)).
2.1.5 Cost Management Tools
MMA gives participating insurers significant latitude to use a variety of cost man-
agement tools in order to control cost and offer lower premiums to beneficiaries.
These tools include the use of drug formularies that list medications covered by the
plan and divide those medications into tiers of preference defined by the level of
cost-sharing. They also include the requirement of prior authorizations and step
therapy, and the use of quantity limits. The availability of such tools to plans allows
them to control costs by limiting moral hazard, as well as by incentivising enrollees
and their physicians to choose medications that are cost-effective. This ability to
affect enrollees choice through formulary design in turn allows plans to negotiate
discounted prices with drug manufacturers in exchange for a favorable placement of
their drugs on the plan’s formulary.
The use of cost management tools, however, is regulated by law. For instance,
MMA requires plans to cover at least two drugs in each therapeutic class. In addi-
tion, CMS requires that all, or substantially all, of the drugs in the antidepressant,
antipsychotic, anticonvulsant, anticancer, immunosuppressant, and HIV/AIDS cat-
egories must be covered by all formularies (Congressional Budget Office (2004)).
The U.S. Pharmacopeia has developed a standard set of therapeutic classes that is
pre-approved by CMS for plans’ use, but plans could use their own classification
subject to CMS approval. The purpose of such formulary requirements is to prevent
the use by plans of formularies that discourage the enrollment of sick beneficiaries.
Furthermore, enrollees have access to a multi-step process to appeal formulary
listings and tier structure decisions that starts with petitioning the plan and, if the
petition is denied, could go through successive stages of review by independent
external review agencies, CMS, an administrative judge, and the federal courts.
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2.2 The Medicare Part D Program from 2006 to 2009
2.2.1 Part D Enrollment
Prior to the implementation of Part D, up to 40 percent of Medicare beneficiaries
lacked any insurance coverage for their expenditures on prescription drugs, and
the majority of those with coverage faced significant out-of-pocket expenditures
(Congressional Budget Office (2002), Safran et al. (2005)). In 2003, for instance,
61.6 percent of Medicare beneficiaries had annual out-of-pocket prescribed drug
expenses between $1 and $2,083, while 20.5 percent had drug expenses between
$2,084 and $4,723, and 8.4 percent spent more than $4,724 on their medications
(Stagnitti (2006)). This led a 1999 National Economic Council study to conclude that
the only meaningful prescription drug coverage for seniors is that provided through
employer retiree drug benefits, which only 25 percent of seniors had (McAdams and
Schwarz (2007)).
The situation changed remarkably after the implementation of the new Medicare
drug benefit. Part D program has had significant enrollment success since its incep-
tion. By June 2009, more than 26 million, or 60%, of Medicare beneficiaries are
enrolled in Medicare drug plans, including 17.5 million in stand-alone prescription
drug plans, and 9 million in MA drug plans (Hargrave et al. (2009a)), bringing the
percentage of beneficiaries with prescription drug coverage to more than 90 percent.
Table (2.3) shows the levels of enrollment in the program in the years 2006 to
2009. Part D enrollment success is similar to that of Medicare Part B (Supplementary
Medical Insurance), which is also a voluntary program, and has similar premium
subsidies and late-enrollment penalties.
A large share of the beneficiaries with no drug coverage have low incomes. In
2007, 13-15% of beneficiaries with incomes below $30,000 had no source of drug
coverage, compared to %10 of those with incomes of $40,000 or more (Cubanski
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et al. (2009)). On the other hand, low income and minority beneficiaries are more
likely to have their drug coverage through Part D plans, especially PDPs (Cubanski
et al. (2009)). This is mostly due to the automatic enrollment of dual eligibles and
other low-income subsidy recipients in Part D plans.
Beneficiaries with fair or poor health are also more likely to have their prescrip-
tion drug coverage through Part D plans. Levy and Weir (2007), using data from the
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), report evidence of significant adverse selection
into Part D. Kaiser Family Foundation researchers, using 2007 MCBS Access to Care
module, report that 47% of beneficiaries in fair health, and 50% of beneficiaries
in poor health were enrolled in a PDP, compared to 30% of beneficiaries in good
or excellent health. In their analysis of their retirement perspective survey (RPS),
Heiss and colleagues (2007) found that 75-80% of the healthy in their sample had
coverage, which is a reasonably high percentage, albeit significantly lower than the
92% for the unhealthy group of respondents.
Table (2.4) shows enrollment trends for non-LIS beneficiaries by plan type. En-
rollment in plans offering gap coverage increased significantly from 2006 to 2007,
declining gradually after that. This pattern tracks the pattern of availability of such
plans. On the other hand, enrollment in enhanced alternative plans increased consis-
tently over the entire period. Such plans offer flexible cost sharing arrangements
(low deductibles and tiered co-payments) in addition to a a benefit value that exceeds
the actuarial value of the basic design established by MMA.
2.2.2 Market Structure, Premiums, and Plan Features
The structure of Part D market has changed significantly over the years (tables 2.5
and 2.6). The average number of Part DP plans offered in a region has increased
significantly from 2006 to 2007, with only a modest decline in the period from
2007 to 2009. Premiums and deductibles have been rising consistently, whereas the
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Table 2.3: Part D Enrollment 2006-2009 (In Millions)
2006 2007 2008 2009
Part D Enrollment 20.4 24.2 25.7 26.9
Medicare Beneficiaries 43.4 44.3 45.2 45.9
Part D share (%) 47.00 54.63 56.86 58.61
Source: Board of Trustees Report, 2009
Excludes Retiree Drug Subsidy Enrollment
Table 2.4: Non-LIS Enrollment Patterns 2006-2009
Feature 2006 2007 2008 2009
Enhanced Alternative 32.0% 37.1% 40.0% 45.8%
Premium > $30 31.8% 34.5% 49.8% 77.0%
Gap 5.8% 14.1% 13.1% 11.8%
number of low income subsidy plans (LIS) has been declining. The proportion of
plans offering coverage in the doughnut hole is higher in 2009 compared to 2006,
but the nature of this gap coverage has changed overtime. In 2006, several plans
provided coverage in the gap for all their formulary medications. Those include
generic as well as brand name prescription drugs. However, by 2009, none of the
PDPs offered gap coverage for all its formulary drugs. The majority of plans offering
gap coverage limit that coverage to some generics, and to a lesser extent to many
generics. This gradual disappearance of the most generous insurance plans from Part
D market suggests the presence of significant levels of within-plan adverse selection.
Such death spirals have been observed in other health insurance markets (Cutler
and Reber (1998)), and were predicted for the market of stand-alone prescription
drug insurance by Pauly and Zeng (2007). Generous plans contain an implicit tax
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due to the delayed onset of catastrophic coverage. This tax and the absence of direct
government subsidy for benefits beyond the basic level specified by law reinforce
the effects of adverse selection into generous plans. The presence of significant
levels of adverse selection could ultimately lead to a race to the bottom, where plans
compete for enrollees with low expected costs by offering benefits that meet the
minimum requirements, leaving consumers with limited coverage and little choice
(Congressional Budget Office (2002), McAdams and Schwarz (2007)).
Despite the availability of a large number of plans in each region, enrollment in
stand-alone Part D plans has been largely concentrated in a plans offered by a few
national insurers. In 2006, ten organizations captured 72 percent of Part D enroll-
ment, primarily in low-premium plans and those with name recognition (Cubanski
and Neuman (2007)). The corresponding average regional Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) for stand-alone Part D contracts in 2006 is 3983, which falls in the
highly concentrated range, as defined by the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission (DOJ and FTC (2007)). This high level of market concentration
persisted in subsequent years, albeit with a downward trend (table 2.5).
The number of low-incomes subsidy (LIS) plans available in the market has gone
down significantly over the years 2007-2009. This is a very interesting phenomenon
that requires further investigation. LIS plans have the advantage of being qualified
to enroll dual eligibles and other LIS-recipients, most of whom are automatically and
randomly enrolled in an LIS plan in their region. To qualify as an LIS plan, a plan
needs to charge a price lower than the a benchmark determined by CMS on a region
by region basis. The benchmark is a function of the bids submitted by the insurers
operating in the region. LIS plans are in general less generous than non-LIS plans,
and rely heavily on formulary design to control cost. Cost sharing is a limited tool
for these plans since a significant proportion of their enrollees receive LIS subsidies
that cover the majority of their cost sharing obligations. The remaining formulary
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design tools are limiting the number of drugs listed and imposing access restrictions
in the form of prior authorizations, step therapy requirements, and quantity limits.
The majority of PDP sponsors use different formularies for LIS offerings and non-LIS
offerings (55% in 2008, 78% in 2009, and 65% in 2010). LIS plans cover fewer
brand drugs than non-LIS plans, are more likely to require prior authorizations for
brand drugs.
The continuing reduction in the number of LIS plans is a sign that such formulary
design tools were not effective in reducing costs enough for LIS plans to continue
to charge a price lower than the benchmark. On the other hand, premiums for LIS
plans have risen steadily (2.7). This could be a consequence of the reduction in the
number of LIS plans available in the market. However, because of the bidding nature
of price setting in this context, it could also be an indication of the enhanced ability
of the most insurers to coordinate their bids.
Table (2.7) shows monthly premium by plan type over the period 2006 to 2009.
Part D markets in any year show significant variation in monthly premiums within, as
well as across, regions (Hargrave et al. (2009b)). This level of variation exists even
within plans with of the same benefit type and with similar observed characteristics.
Such variation is indicative of the presence and importance of plan characteristics
that are not observable to the econometrician, which motivates the use of modeling
techniques to account for unobserved plan heterogeneity. This variation in premiums
is less pronounced for the years 2007-2009.
2.2.3 Enrollees’ Experience
In addition to the high program enrollment, the majority of Part D enrollees are sat-
isfied with the program. In their survey of retirees, Heiss and colleagues found that
the majority of Part D enrollees agree that the program works well once enrollment
is completed (Heiss et al. (2006)). Surveys by Kaiser Family Foundation find that
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Table 2.5: Part D Plan Availability 2006-2009.
Feature 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total PDP Contracts 79 90 87 79
Total PDP Plans 1,446 1,908 1,877 1,739
Avg No. Insurers per Region 19 24 22 22
Avg No. Plans per Region 43 55 53 50
Avg Region HHI 3983 3835 2960 2199
a Author calculation using CMS Plan Source Files.
Table 2.6: Part D Plan Features 2006-2009.
Feature 2006 2007 2008 2009
Avg Premium $37.40 $36.81 $40.02 $45.46
Avg Deductible $92.83 $94.07 $105.04 $114.86
% No Deductible 58.2% 60.6% 58.6% 55.7%
% LIS Plans 29% 34% 27% 18%
% Gap Plans 12.9% 27.5% 29.1% 24.8%
% Defined Standard 9.24% 11.74% 11.91% 10.03
% Actuarially Equivalent 21.61% 13.45% 12.73% 19.05%
% Basic Alternative 26.59% 27.28% 24.64% 18.10%
% Enhanced Alternative 42.55% 47.53% 50.71% 52.82%
a Author calculation using CMS Plan Source Files.
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Table 2.7: Average Premium by Plan Type and Year
2006-2009.
Plan Type 2006 2007 2008 2009
LIS 25.78 25.39 24.74 27.71
Basic no LIS 40.19 35.26 36.75 37.63
Enhanced no Gap 39.72 33.99 31.71 40.58
Gap 49.66 53.24 63.06 73.36
a Author calculation using CMS Plan Source Files.
levels of dissatisfaction with Part D have fallen from 55% at its inception to 34% at
the end of 2006. The remaining areas of dissatisfaction are mainly the complexity of
the program, formularies, the doughnut hole, and tedious appeal procedures (Kaiser
Family Foundation (2006)).
The 2007 MCBS Access to Care module asked respondents a series of questions
to rate their prescription drug coverage. Table (2.8) summarizes these ratings. The
overwhelming majority of respondents with insurance covering prescription drugs
report being satisfied with their coverage, including that obtained through PDPs
and MAPDs. However, Part D satisfaction rates are a little lower than those of other
sources of coverage, including private retiree health plans, federal retiree plans, and
the VA. The other estimates in table (2.8) provide few reasons for the lower rate of
satisfaction among Part D enrollees. Part D enrollees report a significantly higher
incidence of changing medications due to plan formulary restrictions. This includes
switching from brand name to generics, or switching to a different drug with similar
therapeutic effects. The percentage of Part D enrollees who report that their drugs
are not covered by their plan is about double that of beneficiaries with other sources
of coverage. These findings are consistent with those of Levy and Weir (2007), who
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report that HRS respondents with Part D coverage pay more out-of-pocket for a
given number of medications compared to those with employer coverage. Similarly,
Neuman (2007) report results from a national survey indicating that Part D enrollees
had higher out-of-pocket spending and cost-related non-adherence than seniors with
employer or VA coverage.
2.2.4 Government Spending
Table (2.9) shows per enrollee reimbursements to Part D private plans. Government
spending on average has remained stable, around the $1,000, despite the overall
trend in drug prices. This is most likely due to the ability of Part D plans to contain
costs through negotiating lower drug prices with drug manufacturers and through
the implementation of various utilization management techniques. LIS subsidy
payments are similarly stable, albeit at a higher level of around $1,900. Risk sharing
amounts represent payments to, or from, plans associated with the risk corridors
arrangement established by MMA. CMS partially reinsures plans against excessive
business risk by sharing losses, and profits, beyond a percentage point level that is
predetermined for each year. Many Part D Plans in 2006 have obviously underes-
timated Part D benefit costs and submitted low bids that resulted in overall losses
triggering risk corridor payments to plans of around $300 million. The situation
has reversed in 2007 and 2008, with plans gaining profits that exceeded the risk
corridor threshold.
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Table 2.8: 2007 Beneficiaries’ Prescription Drug Coverage Ratings
Variable PDP (%) MAPD (%) Other (%)
(CI) (CI) (CI)
Satisfied 92.0 95.1 96.2
(91.1-92.9) (94.1-96.2) (95.5-96.9)
More Premium 37.6 25.5 30.0
(35.9-39.2) (28.2-31.8) (23.3-27.8)
More Rx Cost 32.9 25.6 28.6
(31.3-34.5) (23.4-27.8) (26.9-30.4)
Less Coverage 8.4 7.8 5.9
(7.5-9.3) (6.5-9.1) (5.0-6.8)
Drugs not Covered 14.0 8.1 6.3
(12.8-15.2) (6.7-9.4) (5.4-7.2)
Brand to Generic 27.0 25.6 26.0
(25.4-28.5) (23.4-27.8) (24.3-27.6)
Switch Drug 9.2 8.1 4.5
(8.2-10.2) (6.7-9.5) (3.7-5.3)
Any Rx Change 24.6 23.1 18.0
(23.2-25.9) (21.2-25.0) (16.8-19.2)
Rx Cost More 19.2 15.3 15.1
17.9-20.6 13.5-17.1 13.7-16.5
Author’s calculation using MCBS Access to Care, 2007
CI’s account for the complex survey design of MCBS
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Table 2.9: Government Per-Enrollee Reimbursements to Part D Plans (current dollars)
2006 2007 2008 2009
All Beneficiaries
Direct Subsidy 867.23 746.52 680.01 700.66
Reinsurance 296.29 331.84 377.13 404.84
Total 1,163.52 1,078.36 1,057.14 1,105.5
Low-Icome
Enrollment (millions) 8.3 9.2 9.7 10.2
LIS subsidy 1,817.05 1,819.63 1,878.57 1,949.85
Risk Sharing (billions) 0.3 -0.7 -1.3 0.9
Source: Board of Trustees Report, 2009




The literature on Medicare Part D is growing exponentially, especially with the
increasing availability of data from public and private sources. Earlier studies on
Part D used data from the pre-Part-D period to attempt to predict effects of program
implementation on coverage for seniors, their out-of-pocket spending, and their
health outcomes (Lucarelli (2006), Yang et al. (2009), Hall (2007), Pizer et al.
(2008)). This review, however, will focus on studies that examined relevant aspects
of Part D using data from the post-Part-D period.
Several papers and reports provide insightful descriptions of the program in terms
of its basic design and trends in insurer participation, plan offerings, and pricing
behavior (Cubanski and Neuman (2007), Hargrave et al. (2009a), Duggan et al.
(2008), McAdams and Schwarz (2007)). Simon and Lucarelli (2006) use CMS data
on plan prices, features, and formularies to examine the determinants of premiums
for Part D plans in 2006. They find that premiums are correlated with drug pricing by
companies and reflect the level of coverage offered by plans. However, the simulated
out-of-pocket measure they use is weakly correlated, and often positively related to
premium. They also report evidence of varying approaches to pricing by different
insurers. Lakdawalla and Yin (2009) examined whether the increases in Part D
enrollment lead insurers to negotiate lower drug prices with pharmacies. They found
evidence to that effect, and estimated that most insurer savings are passed on to
enrollees.
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Another group of papers examine consumers’ experience with the program, in-
cluding how they understood the design and functioning of the program, how they
valued the coverage provided to them by participating plans, and how the program
affected their out-of-pocket spending and drug utilization. Levy and Weir (2008)
used data from the 2004 and 2006 waves of the Health and Retirement Study to
examine the impact of Part D program on enrollees’ use of medications and their
out-of-pocket spending, and to estimate the extent of adverse selection into the
program. They found substantial selection into Part D, but no significant change in
the use of prescription drugs in response to Part D. Their findings suggest that the
Part D program has experienced adverse selection but not moral hazard.
Ketcham et al. (2010) analyzed the choices of Medicare beneficiaries of Part
D plans in 2006 and 2007, and found that, despite the complexity of the choice
context, consumer choices, measured by overspending, improved substantially even
in only one year. They also found that consumers responded to financial incentives
to switch plans, downgrading the importance of inertia in retaining current enrollees.
They emphasize the importance of considering the role of experience and market
responses in reducing participants’ errors and biases that occurred in the early years
of the program.
McFadden and his research group published a series of important studies based
on results from their Retirement and Perspective Survey (RPS). Their papers examine
a host of issues relevant to this research using a variety of modeling perspectives and
techniques. In their first study, they found that despite complexity of the program, a
majority of Medicare population made the right decision of not delaying enrollment
in the program (McFadden (2006)). However, they found that consumers do not
seem to place much value on the insurance component of alternative plans, conclud-
ing that they are likely to have difficulty choosing among plans to fine-tune their
prescription drug coverage. They also found that low income, less educated elderly
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with poor health or some cognitive impairment are significantly less informed and
may fail to take advantage of the program.
In the second paper (Heiss et al. (2006)), the authors used results from the
first and second rounds of RPS to evaluate beneficiaries choices before and after
the implementation of Part D program. Seniors in their survey gave Part D mixed
reviews, with the majority being troubled by the deductible and gap provisions of the
standard benefit, and finding it difficult to determine current and future formularies
of the plan they evaluate.
In Heiss et al. (2010), the authors examine the decisions taken by active choosers,
particularly those who were not automatically enrolled into Part D. They develop
a stylized inter-temporal optimization model, and compare the normative analysis
of this model to actual enrollment decisions by RPS respondents. They evaluate
respondents’ decision to enroll, their time of enrollment, and their plan choice. They
find that beneficiaries’s enrollment choices were in general in line with what the
model predicts given their health status and the market conditions. However, they
also find that beneficiaries were less rational in their choices among plans, often
selecting inexpensive plans when plans with more expensive and comprehensive
coverage were actuarially more favorable to them.
In examining consumers’ choices of plans, they obtained implicit prices of plan
features by estimating hedonic linear regressions, controlling for insurer and state,
and compared those implicit price estimates to estimates of willingness-to-pay (WTP)
obtained by estimating a multinomial logit model for plan choice. In addition, they
compared those implicit prices to actuarial estimates of the cost of offering a particu-
lar feature. They found that, in general, hedonic prices were lower than actuarial
costs of features. On the other hand, they find a reasonable match between implicit
prices and WTPs for some features, especially generic gap coverage for those with
high drug expenditures, but not for other features, such as zero deductible, drug
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tiers, and authorization requirements.
In the last paper in the series (Heiss et al. (2008)), the authors model Part D
enrollment and plan choice using a dynamic discrete choice process. The model
incorporates dynamics of health status, drug use, and mortality, in the spirit of Yang
et al. (2009). They calibrate the model parameters and use individual-level data on
enrollment and plan choice for the first three years of the program to evaluate the
performance of the model. They then use the model to perform policy simulations
concerning the late-enrollment penalty, government subsidies, and risk adjustment.
Their model predicts high enrollment among the healthy, but evidence of significant
adverse selection at the stage of plan generosity. In their policy simulations, they find
that a targeted 16% increase in the government subsidy of Part D will be required to
preserve consumer choice in plan generosity.
The model of Heiss et al. (2008) is informative, but has a few limitations. Un-
like Yang et al. (2009), they do not explicitly model demand for drugs, assuming
that people will use whatever medications they need as determined by their health
status. In addition, they assume perfect competition and use a zero-profit criteria
to determine equilibrium outcomes. This is problematic for two reasons. First,
empirically, health insurance markets are known to be oligopolistic and concentrated
(Robinson (2004)), Dafny et al. (2009)). Second, theoretically, perfect competition
in an insurance market with asymmetric information may result in no equilibrium
(Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)). Lastly, they do not account for non-monetary plan
characteristics, and for unobserved heterogeneity of plans and beneficiaries.
There are several studies in the literature that examine seniors’ demand for Part
D plans using models that address some of these limitations. Most of these studies
adapt discrete choice models to market level data using the approach introduced by
Berry (1994). This approach was used previously in the health economics literature
to study demand for Medicare HMOs (Town and Liu (2003), Dowd et al. (2003),
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Maruyama (2006)) . Berry remarked that the logit and nested-logit models used to
analyze discrete choices of individuals could be log-transformed into linear models
of product demand where probability of a choice could be interpreted as its market
share. This insight permitted researchers to use these models to study demand using
market level data. In addition, Berry’s linear transformation allowed for the use of
instruments for price, which is difficult to do in non-linear models.
Three papers have applied this approach to study demand for Medicare Part
D plans. The first is by Keating (2007), who studies demand for Medicare Part D
in 2006 and 2007 using logit, nested-logit, and random utility models. He used
demand estimates from these models to quantify switching costs for consumers,
which he finds to be substantial and exceeding, on average, premiums paid by
beneficiaries. In particular, he finds that consumers are significantly less elastic
in 2007 compared to 2006, with elasticity estimates of -1.6 and -2.5, respectively.
He proposes that the difference is due to consumers finding it difficult to switch
plans once enrolled. The assumption he maintains is that the substantial changes
in the behavior of beneficiaries and firms between the first and second years of
the program are rationalizable. In particular, Keating interprets differences in price
sensitivity estimates between the two years as evidence of change in preferences
that indicate the presence of switching costs. An alternative explanation, however, is
the possibility of beneficiaries and firms learning more over time about each other
and the market conditions in general. This would mean that the later preference
estimates are more likely to uncover the true preference parameters.
The second paper is by Lucarelli et al. (2008). The authors of this paper use a
nested-logit model to estimate demand for Part D plans in 2006. They used demand
estimates and a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium concept to derive insurer’s marginal costs.
They then used both demand and supply estimates to conduct policy experiments
examining the implications of simplifying choice by reducing the number of plans
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available to beneficiaries. They find that search costs should be at least two thirds of
the average monthly premium in order to justify a regulation that allows only two
plans per firm, and that this number would be substantially lower if the limitation
in the number of plans is coupled with a decrease in product differentiation, for
instance, by removing plans with gap coverage.
The main drawback of these two studies is the use of plan enrollment data that
includes both low-income subsidy (LIS) beneficiaries and non-LIS enrollees. The
design of Part D benefit for LIS beneficiaries is considerably different from the benefit
for non-LIS enrollees. LIS beneficiaries do not pay premiums or deductibles, and
have coverage in the doughnut hole. They also pay small copayments. Lastly, and
most importantly for demand analysis purposes, the government facilitates their
enrollments by automatically and randomly assigning them to Part D plans with
premiums below a region-specific benchmark. Many beneficiaries remain in their
assigned plans, although they are entitled to switch to a different plan if they prefer.
This random assignment means that observable enrollment patterns for LIS benefi-
ciaries do not purely represent their active choices, and, as such, do not reflect their
underlying preferences. Therefore, the inclusion of these enrollment patterns in an
overall analysis of demand by Medicare Part D enrollees will result in estimates that
do not reflect the preferences of the average enrollee.
The third paper, by Frakt and Pizer (2010), attempts to avoid this problem by re-
stricting analysis to enrollments by non-LIS beneficiaries. The authors use data from
2008 for state-level LIS enrollments, and impose multiple assumptions to estimate
plan-level LIS enrollment for the year 2007. They then excluded this enrollment to
generate enrollment by non-LIS enrollees. The aim of their analysis is to estimate
beneficiary price sensitivity in the Medicare Part D market, focusing on the market
for stand alone plans (PDPs). Their estimate of the elasticity of enrollment with
respect to premium is -1.45, which is significantly higher than the [-0.33, -0.12]
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range of estimates from previous studies calculating premium elasticity of demand
for Medicare HMOs (Dowd et al. (2003), Town and Liu (2003), Atherly (2002)).
There are few issues with this study, however, apart from the fact that the data
are generated based on a set of assumptions. First, their specification includes
organization dummies but not regional dummies or other regional control variables,
which leaves unaccounted for several demand factors that are potentially correlated
with the instruments they chose. In addition, their model includes a potentially
endogenous variable that is not instrumented for. The variable is an indicator for
LIS plans, which are plans with premiums below a weighted average of their region.
Therefore, the indicator is a function of premium, and consequently endogenous in
their specification.
Of the these three papers, only Keating (2007) extended the analysis to account
for heterogeneity in consumer preferences. He estimated a random utility model
using the approach introduced by Berry et al. (1995) (BLP). The results are in line
with those from his nested-logit model, with elasticity significantly lower in 2007
compared to 2006 (-1.3 and -2.6, respectively). His model included interactions be-
tween plan characteristics and consumer demographics that are useful in explaining
parameter heterogeneity. For instance, enrollees with higher medical expenditures
are found to be less sensitive to premium. On the other hand, the random component
of heterogeneity was not statistically significant.
Abaluck and Gruber (2009) also use a random utility approach to estimate de-
mand for Part D plans. The authors used a large dataset obtained from Wolters
Kluwer that included information on drug utilization and insurer choices by millions
of Part D enrollees. They limit their analysis to non-LIS enrollees and estimate a
multinomial conditional logit model to examine enrollees’ plan choices in 2006.
The objective of their analysis is to test if enrollees’ choices are consistent with
optimization. They find that Part D enrollees make choices that are inconsistent with
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utility maximization under perfect information. For instance, enrollees place higher
emphasis on premiums compared to expected out-of-pocket costs, and over-value
certain financial plan features, such as gap coverage, beyond any impact of these fea-
tures on their out-of-pocket spending. They used models of parameter heterogeneity
to test the robustness of these findings. They only include random heterogeneity
and find significant heterogeneity in the coefficients on premium, deductible, and






Following previous literature (Abaluck and Gruber (2009), Town and Liu (2003),
Keating (2007), Lucarelli et al. (2008)), I model the utility U of beneficiary i from
choosing a prescription drug plan p in region r as a linear function of the plan’s
premium, deductible, and measures of plan generosity.
Uipr =−αi ppr +X ￿pβi +ηpr + εipr (4.1)
where ppr is the plan’s premium, Xp is a k×1 vector of plan features including
annual deductible and measures of plan generosity, and αi and βi are individual
specific taste parameters. The error term in (4.1) has two components; ηpr is a
plan-level error term which captures common valuation of plan features that are not
captured by premium and X , such as reputation, customer service, and the structure
of pharmacy network. εipr is an idiosyncratic error assumed to be iid with Type-1
extreme value distribution across individuals and plans. Note that X ’s are assumed
to be constant for plan p in year y across all regions in which it is offerred. This
is not a requirement of the program, but holds true for the vast majority of part D
plans, and provides a rational for the exogeniety of plan features.
The utility specification in (4.1) is of the random coefficient (mixed) logit form,
which could be estimated using the approach introduced by Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes (1995), henceforth labeled BLP. The individual parameters are modeled as
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functions of observed and unobserved individual characteristics. Following Nevo
(2001), I specify the parameters as follows:
(αi) = (α)+ΠpDi +Σpνip, νip ∼ Pν p, Di ∼ P̂D (4.2)
(βi) = (β )+ΠxDi +Σxνix, νix ∼ Pνx, Di ∼ P̂D (4.3)
Where α and β are population averages of the individual specific parameters,
Di is a d ×1 vector of demographic variables, νip and νix are, respectively, 1×1 and
k× 1 vectors of unobserved individual characteristics determining preferences to
premiums and plan generosity and assumed to have a parametric distributions given
by Pν p and Pνx; PD is the nonparametric distribution of demographic characteristics
derived from data sources described below, Πα and Πβ are, respectively, a 1×d vec-
tor and a k×d matrix of coefficients that measure how taste characteristics vary with
demographics; and Σp and σx are variance-covariance matrices of the multivariate
normal distribution of the unobserved individual characteristics νip and νix.
To complete the specification of the demand system, I need to model the outside
option. The outside option comprises all the other options, besides stand-alone part
D plans, that are available to Medicare beneficiaries. These include fee-for-service
(FFS) Medicare with no drug coverage, Medicare Advantage plans with or without
drug coverage, and FFS Medicare with employer or union supplemental drug cover-
age, including VA, FEHB, and TRICARE. The indirect utility from this outside option
is given by
ui0r = η0r +Π0Di +σ0νi0 + εi0r (4.4)
The mean utility from the outside option, η0r, and the coefficients Π0 and σO
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are not identified separately from the coefficients on individual characteristics in
(4.2). I set these coefficients to equal zero, which normalizes the indirect utility from
the outside option to equal the idiosyncratic error term εi0r. Let θ = (θ1,θ2) refer to
the vector of all the model parameters, where θ1 = (α,β ), and θ2 = (Πp,Πx,Σp,Σx).
Combining equations (4.1) and (4.2), we have
uipr = δpr(ppr,Xp,ηpr;θ1)+µipr(ppr,Xp;θ2)+ εipr (4.5)
where
δpr = α ppr +X ￿pβ +ηpr
and
µipr = [ppr](ΠpDi +Σpνip)+ [X ￿p](ΠxDi +Σxνix)
The term δpr is the mean utility from plan p in region r, and is common to all
beneficiaries in that region. Deviations from the population mean are subsumed in
the term µipr +εipr, which is a mean-zero heteroskedastic deviation that captures the
effect of individual characteristics.
Beneficiaries choose the option that gives them highest utility. This defines the
set of unobserved consumer characteristics that lead to the choice of a particular
plan:
Apr(X.r, p.r,δ.r;θ2) = {Di,νip,νix,εi0, ...,εiPr|uipr ≥ uip￿r}












￿ exp(αi ppr +X ￿pβi +ηpr)
1+∑p￿ exp(αi pp￿r +X ￿p￿yβi +ηp￿r)
dP(ν)dP(D) (4.8)
Computing the integral in equation (4.8) requires specifying the probability
distributions P(ν) and P(D). If one assumes that individual heterogeneity enters
only through the idiosyncratic error term εipr which is iid across individuals and
products and is distributed type-1 extreme value, then the standard multinomial
logit demand model is obtained. However, the multinomial logit model is known
to give rise to unrealistic own- and cross-price elasticities resulting from its implied
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption (IIA) (McFadden et al. (1998),
BLP, Nevo (2000)). In particular, the model restricts elasticities to be a function
of market share, regardless of characteristics. Two products with the same market
share are predicted to have the same cross price elasticity with a third product, even
if the characteristics of that product are closer to one than the other. Models that
introduce correlations in the structure of the error term εipr, such as the generalized
extreme value model (McFadden 1978), are less restrictive but require predetermined
grouping of products assumed by the modeler. The nested logit model is an example
of this type of models. Here the products are grouped into predetermined exclusive
and exhaustive sets, and εipr is decomposed into an iid shock plus a group-specific
component (Nevo (2000)).
The full model described above accommodates a richer form of consumer het-
erogeneity. Consumers differ not only in the additive error term εi but also in their
tastes for plan characteristics, including premiums. Correlation between product
choices is introduced through the term µipr, which is a function of both product and
consumer characteristics, and εipr is again assumed to be iid across consumers and
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products.
The advantage of more realistic price elasticities comes at the cost of computa-
tional difficulty. The integral in equation (4.7) does not have a closed form solution,
and will have to be computed numerically. This difficulty is largely overcome using
simulation methods; a technique introduced by Pakes (1986). The distribution of
personal characteristics can be obtained by sampling from available surveys of Medi-
care beneficiaries with regional coverage, such as the Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey (MCBS).
After obtaining the predicted market shares given by (4.8), one could, in principle,
proceed by estimating the model parameters using a minimum distance approach.
The estimated parameters will be those that minimize the difference between ob-
served and predicted market shares. However, such an approach does not take into
account the potential correlation between premium and unobserved product charac-
teristics, ηpr, and consequently will generate inconsistent estimates. The methods
introduced by Berry (1994) and BLP are designed to deal with this endogeneity
problem through linearizing the model and using appropriate instruments for pre-
mium. An alternative method was recently suggested by Petrin and Train (2010),
and involves using a control function approach to account for the unobserved plan
features. Petrin and Train compared their approach to that of BLP and found that, at




Let Jry be the set of plans offered by insurer j in region r. The profit function for
insurer j is given by
π jr = ∑
p∈Jr
πp jr (4.9)




Sip jr(sbi + pp jr −mcip jr)dP(ν)dP(D))×Mr −FCp jr (4.10)
where sbi is premium subsidy paid by CMS, mcip jr is the expenditure on prescrip-
tion drugs that i is expected to cost plan pr, Mr is the number of part D eligible
Medicare beneficiaries in region r and FCp jr refers to fixed costs of operating part D
plan(s) in region r, including setting up pharmacy networks, establishing relations
with wholesalers and pharmaceutical companies, etc.
Insurers compete by setting premiums and features in a four-stage game. In the
first stage, insurers choose the regions to enter and the number of plans to offer
in each region. In the second stage, insurers choose plan features, which are the
same for any plan in all the regions in which it is offered. In the third stage, insurers
choose premiums for plans on a region-by-region basis. Therefore, the same plan
could have different premiums in different regions. In the final stage, consumers
choose plans that maximize their expected utility and costs and profits are realized.
A Nash equilibrium is assumed to exist for this strategic game between insurers.
I will only model the third and fourth stages of this game, assuming that market
structure and plan characteristics are exogenous.
Using backward induction, insurers solve for optimal premiums given any choice









(sbi + pp jr −mcip jr)+Sip￿ jr]dP(ν)dP(D) = 0 (4.11)
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I assume that beneficiaries and plans play a static game; that is, their payoff
functions do not include any dynamic effects of current decisions. This is an obvious
simplification, but one that has been widely used in the literature (Town and Liu
(2003), Abaluck and Gruber (2009), Lucarelli et al. (2008), Lustig (2007)).
4.3 Identification
Identification in the model above comes from variation in premiums, characteristics,
and enrollment across plans, and regions, as well as from variation in the choice sets
and demographics across regions. The coefficient on premium is identified by observ-
ing how demand for a plan varies with premium, fixing all plan features. Similarly,
the coefficients on plan features are identified by observing how enrollment changes
with features, holding everything else the same. Identification of the distribution of
taste parameters comes from differences in choice sets available to beneficiaries in
different regions, and from the variation in consumer characteristics across regions.
Having a large number of plans with positive market shares indicates that a region
has a higher level of consumer heterogeneity compared to regions with only limited
choice sets.
The main challenge in estimating the proposed model is to deal with the likely
endogeneity of premium in a non-linear system. I will follow the approach devel-
oped by BLP, which linearizes the demand model and instruments for endogenous
variables in a GMM framework. To linearize the model, I use Berry’s contraction
mapping to derive a value for δpr for any given θ2 that equates predicted shares
to the actual market share of plan pr (Berry (1994)). I then use the derived δpr
to construct the structural error to be used in the GMM objective function. The
structural error is ηpr, which could be written as
ηpr = δpr −α ppr −X ￿pβ (4.12)
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Similar to Keating (2007) and Lucarelli et al (2008), I used instruments that are
functions of the characteristics of competing firms in the same region. The instru-
ments are based on an approach similar to that used by BLP and Bresnahan et al.
(1997). They include observed characteristics for each plan, counts of characteristics
of other plans in the region in the same nest, and counts of characteristics of plans
offered by the same insurer in the region. These instruments are assumed to be
uncorrelated with omitted and unobservable plan characteristics, but correlated
with premium. The exogeneity of this set of instruments is predicated on assuming
the exogeneity of observed characteristics, of which they are functions. This is a
standard assumption in most of the discrete choice literature (Berry (1994), Berry
et al. (1995), Nevo (2000)), and is especially feasible given the design of Medicare
Part D program. Plans offered in multiple regions may have different premiums, but
they share the same deductible, gap coverage, and formulary. This means that the
choice of deductible, gap coverage, and formulary is taken at a supra-regional level
and could be considered exogenous to demand in a specific region.
However, observed plan characteristics could be correlated with other unob-
served characteristics that are shared between regions. For instance, insurers with
experience in offering plans to Medicare beneficiaries are likely to have developed a
better understanding of their preferences and health status, compared to those with
limited or no such experience. They are also more likely to have developed more
efficient marketing strategies that are specifically tailored to this segment of the
market. This would result in a correlation between the observed design features and
the unobserved marketing strategies. I guard against this possibility by including
insurer-level fixed effects that capture unobserved insurer characteristics. The corre-
lation of the proposed instruments with premium stems from the relationship, in a
differentiated oligopoly market, between the characteristics of competing products
and demand elasticity and markup. Demand in such a market is more elastic if
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competitors offer products that are less differentiated, and vice versa.
The demand moments using this set of instruments are:
E[(δpr −α ppr −X ￿pβ )Zpr)] = 0 (4.13)
where Z is a matrix of instruments. The GMM objective function to be minimized
is
Q(θ) = M(θ)￿AM(θ) (4.14)





(δpr −α ppr −X ￿pyβ )Zpr) (4.15)
and A is a weighting matrix:
A = (Z￿Z)−1
4.4 Estimation
4.4.1 Logit and Nested Logit Model
The logit and nested-logit specifications are simple demand models that would pro-
vide a valuable first look at the data before embarking on the more complicated task
of estimating the full random utility model. In addition, estimating these models
allows us to compare our results with those from previous studies using the two
models. Their estimation is based on Berry’s linearization approach. We can write
the indirect utility from plan p and the outside option in region r as
uipr = α ppr +X ￿pβ +ηpr + εipr (4.16)
ui0r = εi0r (4.17)
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where ηpr is the mean unobserved quality of plan p in region r. The logit model as-
sumes that εipr is iid and type-1-extreme-value distributed, which gives the following
closed-form solution for expected shares:
spr =
exp(αi ppr +X ￿pyβi +ηpr)
1+∑p￿ exp(αi pp￿r +X ￿p￿βi +ηp￿r)
(4.18)
Taking logs and rewriting (4.18) we get
log(spr)− log(s0r) = α ppr + x￿pβ +ηpr (4.19)
Similarly, the nested logit model could be written as
log(spr)− log(s0r) = α ppr + x￿pβ +σ log(spr|Gr)+ηpr (4.20)
where spry|Gr is the market share of plan pr within its group, and groups are
defined by benefit type (basic vs. enhanced). Consistent coefficient estimates are
obtained by running two-stage-least-square regressions using equations (4.18) and
(4.19) and the instruments described in section (4.3).
The nested logit model relaxes the iid assumption of the error term in the logit
model by introducing group-specific correlations. This is one way to account for the
interaction between plan features and consumer characteristics by assuming that
consumer valuations for products within each group are correlated. The logit model
should be rejected in favor of the nested logit model if the estimation of (4.20)
results in an estimate of σ that is statistically significant.
4.4.2 The Full Model
The estimation procedure of the full model is composed of an inner and an outer
loop. The inner loop uses Berry’s contraction mapping to find, for each value of
θ2, the vector of mean utility δ.r for all plans in the region that equates expected
shares with actual market shares. Expected shares are computed using a simulation
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technique similar to BLP. The distribution of demographics, P(D) is simulated by
sampling from MCBS 2006. The vector of mean utility is then used to compute the
structural error in equation (4.12).
The outer loop uses numerical optimization to minimize the objective function
in (4.13) over the set of Θ. I use a quasi-Newton optimization algorithm from
the Matlab optimization toolbox. To increase the chances of arriving at a global
minimum, I use 50 vectors of starting points generated from a standard normal






I use several data sources for the analysis of premium determinants and the de-
mand for Part D plans. For the analysis of premium determinants, I use data for
the years 2007 to 2009, along with the corresponding simulations described below.
For analysis of demand for Part D plans, I only use data from 2009 as plan-level
enrollment numbers for low-income-subsidy (LIS) beneficiaries are not available for
earlier years.
CMS provides annual plan landscape files that list all the plans offered in the
particular year with their basic features, such as premium, deductible, benefit type,
and gap coverage. The landscape files are available for the years 2006-2010. CMS
enrollment files provide enrollment in each plan by region and county. They also
provide the number of Medicare beneficiaries who are eligible for Part D in each Part
D region. Enrollment files are available for the years 2006-2009.
Plans’ formulary data come from CMS formulary and pharmacy network files.
The files provide a list of all the drugs included in each plan’s formulary, together
with their tier placement and copayment or co-insurance. The files use national drug
code (NDC) to identify each drug. The formulary files are available for the years
2006-2009. The 2009 formulary files include pricing data for each NDC included in
a plan’s formulary. Specifically, the file contains the average cost to enrollees of a
30-day supply of each NDC. Drug prices are needed for the out-of-pocket costs and
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plan costs simulations described below. This information, however, is not available
for previous years. To overcome that, I deflated 2009 prices using Consumer Price
Index (CPI) to generate average prices for the years 2007 and 2008.
I use data from the The Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) to simulate
out-of-pocket costs and plan costs, and to draw from the empirical distribution of
demographics for the estimation of the full model. MCBS is a comprehensive annual
survey of a nationally representative sample of Medicare beneficiaries. It includes
detailed information on demographic characteristics, health status, health insurance,
and healthcare utilization. The Cost and Use files of the data release validate survey
responses related to utilization and link them to the corresponding claims in CMS’s
administrative data (Adler (1994)). I use MCBS 2006 Cost and Use files for the
analysis, which is the latest release of these files. For each respondent, the files
provide detailed information on their drug utilization, including drug name, dosage,
and quantity. This information enables me to simulate each respondent’s expected
out-of-pocket costs if they join a plan by matching their drugs to those on the plan’s
formulary.
5.2 Simulating Out of Pocket Costs and Plan Costs
The objective of these simulations is to generate an index of plan generosity using
the distribution of expected beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket costs. I used drug utilization
data from MCBS 2006 Cost and Use files, together with plan formulary data from
CMS. The same MCBS 2006 data was used to simulate expected out of pocket costs
for the plans offered in the years 2007, 2008, and 2009. A necessary assumption for
this exercise is that drug utilization by beneficiaries remains the same; that is, on
expectation, beneficiaries’s use of medications is the same a year later, regardless
of their choice of prescription drug plan. This is not an ideal assumption, but is
reasonable enough given the evidence that medication use is highly correlated over
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time (Ellis and McGuire (2007)). In addition, Levy and Weir (2008), using data
from the Health and Retirement Survey, found no evidence of moral hazard after
joining part D (Levy and Weir (2008)). Moreover, even if the absolute levels of these
simulated costs are not accurate, what matters for the purposes of this study is their
usefulness as a measure of a plan’s generosity relative to competing plans.
MCBS 2006 Cost and Use files contain the Prescription Medicine Events (PME)
file that lists, for every sampled beneficiary, details of each incident of medication
purchase. The details include the name of the drug, its strength, quantity, total
amount paid for that purchase, the amount paid out-of-pocket, and the amount(s)
paid by private and public insurance sources.
The first step in the simulation process is to clean drug names in MCBS PME
files to match the names in formulary files. This was done manually. Some of
the medications in the MCBS files had no names. For some of those, there were
associated NDCs that were used to find the name using the National Drug Code
directory maintained by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). For others, it was
possible to reasonably guess the name of the drug using other events that were likely
refills of the same medication (judging from the details of the event, such as total
cost, medication strength, quantity, etc). I dropped those events that remained with
no names.
The second step is to obtain prices for these drug events. Plans compete to
secure lower drug costs to their enrollees, which allows them to offer generous
coverage at lower premiums. The simulations should ideally capture this aspect of
plan differentiation. However, plan-specific pricing data is only available for 2009.
For the years 2007 and 2008, I used average prices, derived by deflating the averages
of plan-specific prices in 2009, and applied those prices to all plans. As a result,
simulations for these two years only capture differentiation along plans’ benefit
design, but not their ability to obtain lower drug prices.
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Thirdly, I cleaned the days-supply data in MCBS files to match those in formulary
files. Formulary files have either a 30-day supply or a 90-day supply option, whereas
MCBS files have a range of days-supply entries. I considered any days-supply entry
in MCBS that is less than 30 days as a 30-day supply, and any thing above 30 days
as a 90-day supply.
Fourthly, I created refill episodes using data on the number of times a particular
medication was refilled, and grouped those medications with refill times that are
close enough.
And lastly, I matched prescription drug events to plan formulary files using drug
name and days-supply. This allowed me to calculate the required copay for that
event, taking into account features of the plan, including the tier of the drug and
level of coverage under which the event took place (initial coverage period, doughnut





Studying the factors that influence the setting of premiums by insurers is of interest
in and of itself and deserves a separate and detailed investigation (Simon and Lu-
carelli (2006)). That is not the ultimate objective of this study. Instead, this analysis
of premium determinants is done in the context of studying demand for Part D plans
and is undertaken primarily for assessment purposes. The simulations of plan costs
and out-of-pocket expenditures described in chapter (5) are computationally com-
plex and involve assumptions and simplifications that could affect their validity as
measures to be used in demand estimation. Examining a simple model of premium
setting provides a reasonable test of such validity.
Table (6.1) shows the estimates from three specifications regressing premium
on a list of variables that are likely to influence insurers’ pricing decisions. The
estimates were obtained using data from the years 2007 to 2009. Deductible is
expected to be negatively correlated with premium. Plans with higher deductible,
holding other features constant, expose enrollees to higher out-of-pocket payments,
which decreases plans’ costs and reduces the overall value of the plan. Gap cov-
erage and average plan costs are measures of a plan’s generosity and its cost to
the insurer. Average-plan-cost is a derived variable created by simulating expected
plan expenditures using each plan’s benefit design and formulary structure and the
medication profiles of 2006 MCBS respondents in the plans’ region. This variable
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could be used as a measure of the generosity of a plan’s benefit. It summarizes the
various aspects of a plan’s benefit, including its formulary design, tier structure, and
cost-sharing arrangement. I use simulated average plan cost instead of simulated
average out-of-pocket spending, to be used later in demand estimation, primarily
because it is easier to interpret in a model of premium setting. The two variables,
however, are generated using the same procedure and are highly correlated.
Plans providing gap coverage and assuming higher costs, on average, provide
superior actuarial value to their enrollees and will need to charge higher premiums
to cover their costs. Gap coverage could also differentiate a plan from its com-
petitors allowing it to charge a higher markup. The positive association between
premium and measures of generosity reflects standard price-cost relationship for
a profit-maximizing firm (reflecting demand elasticity and the nature and level of
competition). In addition, it reflects firms’ expectations of the effect of increased
generosity on the extent of moral hazard and adverse selection. If firms expect
significant levels of moral hazard and adverse selection, then their markups will be a
complex function of expected demand elasticity, expected level of competition, and
the anticipated levels of moral hazard and adverse selection.
Specification (1) includes the variable national, indicating whether a plan is of-
fered in all of the 34 Part D regions. Such plans are offered mostly by large insurers,
such as Aetna, United Health, and Humana. The correlation between premium
and the national indicator could go either way. Large insurers enjoy economies of
scale and are in a better position to negotiate better terms with drug manufacturers
and pharmacy networks (Lakdawalla and Yin (2009), Duggan and Morton (2010)),
which would allow them to charge premiums lower than competition. On the other
hand, most beneficiaries recognize the names of large insurers and may have used
one of their Medigap or Medicare Advantage products. This brand recognition and
prior beneficiary experience may allow large insurers to exact a higher markup. A
48
negative coefficient on the indicator would suggest the former effect, while a positive
coefficient would suggest the latter.
Specification (1) also includes region-level variables that are expected to affect
premiums in the region. The number of insurers offering Part D plans in a region
ranges from 20-27 in the period 2007-2009, with most of the regions having 22-25
insurers. The number of insurers operating in a region indicates the potential level
of competition for enrollees in that regions. Regions with more insurers are likely to
witness higher levels of competition and lower premiums as a result. The percentage
of Medicare beneficiaries who are also eligible for Medicaid was computed using
MCBS 2007 Access to Care module. Low-income subsidy recipients pay no premium
if they enroll in qualified plans. To be qualified, plans are required to charge premi-
ums lower than a region-specific benchmark determined by CMS using plan bids. A
larger fraction of dual eligibles in a region is expected to lead to more plans trying
to qualify to enroll them, lowering average premium in the region.
There are other variables that remain unaccounted for in specification (1) (Simon
and Lucarelli (2006), Keating (2007)). Some of those variables are at the regional
level, while others are at the level of the insurer and the plan. For instance, plans use
regional measures of health status and utilization of prescription drugs to estimate
actuarial costs of different benefit designs. Prior experience in providing insur-
ance products to Medicare beneficiaries, either in Medicare Advantage or Medigap
markets, may allow insurers to utilize their brand name value and charge higher
premiums for their Part D products. Insurers with better marketing channels may
use those to differentiate their product from competition, allowing them to charge
higher premiums. Specification (2) adds a region fixed effect to capture the effect
of those region-level variables that are time invariant. We are then left with other
insurer-level and plan-level variables that are not included in the model. I account
for the time-invariant component of unmeasured insurer-level variables by adding a
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fixed effect for parent organization in specification (3) .
Accounting for unmeasured plan-level variables is more complicated. Plans of-
fered in different regions with the same name share most of the features, including
deductible, gap coverage, formulary design, and cost-sharing structure. Those fea-
tures change from year to year, so it is possible to include a plan-level fixed effect in
the model to account for unobservable plan features. However, this would limit the
model to explaining premium variation within the same plan over the years, which
is limited compared to premium variation between plans in each year. Therefore,
no plan-level fixed effects are included. The aim of this analysis, however, is not
to examine hypotheses of causal relations, but rather to examine how premium
is correlated with average plan cost and other variables to be used in demand
estimation.
Most of the estimates from the preferred specification (3) are significant and
have the expected signs. The coefficient on the deductible is negative and significant.
The magnitude of the coefficient means that for a one dollar increase in annual
deductible, ceteris paribus, leads to a 24 cent reduction in annual premium. Simon
and Lucarelli (2006) and Keating (2007), using different sets of determinants in
their analyses, report estimates of 12 cents and 36 cents, respectively.
It is not immediately evident what the magnitude of this coefficient is expected
to be. For instance, if a plan has a zero deductible and all enrollees expect to
utilize prescription drugs, and the market is perfectly competitive with no moral
hazard or adverse selection, then an increase in deductible by one dollar should
lower annual premium by the same amount. On the other hand, if a plan has a
high deductible, and a large proportion of its enrollees do not expect to spend that
much on prescription drugs, then an increase in deductible affects these enrollees
only to the extent that they become less insured against the risk of a bad health
shock leading to higher utilization. Therefore, in this case, the plan could get a way
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with a small reduction in premium since raising deductible affects only slightly the
expected out-of-pocket payments for the majority of its enrollees. The effect for a
more realistic plan, with mixed enrollment and a small to moderate deductible, is
expected to be somewhere in the middle of these two extremes. Moreover, deductible
is likely to be correlated with plan features that are omitted from the model, which
complicates the interpretation of the estimated coefficient.
The coefficient on the indicator for national plans is negative but statistically
insignificant. The point estimate means that large insurers, on average, use their low-
cost advantage to charge lower premiums. The positive and significant coefficient
on average plan cost is a good indication that this simulated index is capturing what
it is intended to capture. However, the positive and significant coefficient on the gap
coverage indicator suggests that some of the features of plans with gap coverage are
not captured by a linear term of simulated plan cost. Nonetheless, specifications with
quadratic and logarithmic terms (not shown) have similar results. The gap coverage
indicator may be reflecting, in addition to generosity, a degree of differentiation that
allows plans to charge higher premiums.
The coefficient on average plan cost means that, holding deductible and gap
coverage constant, an increase in monthly average costs by one dollar increases
monthly premium by only 13 cents. Attenuation bias due to omitted variables and
measurement error in this simulated variable are possible reasons for this low esti-
mate. The correlation between gap coverage and average plan costs complicates the
interpretation of the magnitude of the coefficient on gap coverage. The estimate of
this coefficient means that, holding deductible and average cost constant, providing
coverage in the gap increases premium by $22 on average. However, gap coverage
is invariably associated with an increase in average plan cost, which means that gap
coverage is priced at more than $22 (see section 6.2). The year fixed effects are
positive and significant, reflecting the upward trend in premiums over the period
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2007-2009.
The determinants considered in specification (1) of this analysis explain around
60% of the variation in premiums within each region over the years 2007 to 2009.
Including fixed effects for the parent organization in specification (2) increases
the explanatory power of the model to around 74%, indicating the presence of an
idiosyncratic component of the pricing decision. Table (6.2) shows that this idiosyn-
cratic component is particularly large in 2006 and it gets smaller over the years.
This is consistent with evidence in the literature that insurers in 2006 were testing
the waters and using different approaches to price their plans (Simon and Lucarelli
(2006)), reflecting the significant levels of uncertainty surrounding the conditions
of the market in the early years. The gradual reduction in the importance of this
idiosyncratic component suggests that insurers’ pricing strategies are converging
over time, which in turn suggests the presence of a common process of market
learning.
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Table 6.1: Premium Determinants
Variable 1 2 3
Deductible −0.016∗ −0.013 −0.019∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Gap Coverage 23.70∗∗ 22.15∗∗ 22.40∗∗
(3.62) (3.70) (3.08)








2008 2.03 3.42∗∗ 1.64
(1.50) (1.46) (1.70)
2009 10.61∗∗ 12.12∗∗ 13.03∗∗
(1.78) (1.82) (1.93)
Intercept 35.95∗∗ 21.97∗∗ 20.61∗∗
(3.48) (3.25) (3.93)
Fixed Effects None Region Region,
Organization
R2 0.59 0.602 0.74
a Data for years 2007 to 2009. Standard errors clustered by plan.
Number of Insurers and % Medicaid variables are at the regional level.
Significance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Fixed Effects Region,Year Organization,
Region, Year
a Data for years 2006 to 2009. From regression of
premium on deductible, and indicators for gap
coverage and national plans.
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6.2 The Logit and Nested Logit Models
I estimate the linearized logit and nested-logit models specified in equations (4.19)
and (4.20) using plan characteristics that are observable to beneficiaries at the time
of enrollment. The models regress the difference between the log of plan share and
the log of the share of the outside option on premium, deductible, gap coverage, and
simulated average out-of-pocket spending. This simulated measure of generosity
resembles what Medicare provides to enrollees through its Plan Finder tool. Medi-
care encourages beneficiaries to use this tool during open enrollment to choose
plans that best match their needs. Medicare beneficiaries can enter their current
medications into the Plan Finder to get an estimate of how much they should expect
to pay out-of-pocket if they joined a particular plan in their region. The average
out-of-pocket spending variable I use is generated by averaging similar simulated
plan estimates for all 2006 MCBS respondents. The outside option is composed of
traditional fee-for-service Medicare with no drug coverage, Medicare Advantage Part
D plans (MAPD), and other sources of prescription drug coverage, such as employer
sponsored plans and federal employee plans.
I also include fixed effects to account for unobservable region-level and insurer-
level demand factors. Important region-level demand factors include the size of the
market, the level of demand for prescription drugs, and the characteristics of the
outside option in the region, such as the size of the MAPD market, and uptake of
retiree drug subsidy by employers in the region. Insurer-level demand factors include
its size and ability to bargain with drug manufacturers and pharmacy networks, its
marketing approach, and its experience in serving Medicare beneficiaries through
Medicare Advantage plans and Meigap plans.
I use aggregate and LIS plan-level enrollment data to compute enrollment by
non-LIS beneficiaries in 2009. Limiting demand estimation to non-LIS beneficiaries
is crucial for the validity of our revealed preference estimates. The majority of
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LIS beneficiaries are randomly assigned to qualified plans in their region. Hence,
enrollment patterns resulting from this assignment do not reflect the choices of these
beneficiaries. Excluding their enrollment ensures that the derived demand estimates
reflect actual consumer choices and are not contaminated by administrative decisions
taken on their behalf.
Table (6.3) shows demand estimates for non-LIS enrollees from the logit and
nested logit models described in equations (4.19) and (4.20). The coefficients ob-
tained from the logit and nested-logit specifications reflect structural estimates of
parameters of the utility from enrolling in a Part D plan. Gap coverage is expected
to increase enrollees’ utility, while higher deductible and out-of-pocket spending are
expected to lower utility.
Deductible, gap coverage, and average out-of-pocket spending are correlated
by design. Average out-of-pocket spending incorporates amounts paid towards the
deductible, and coverage during the gap reduces out-of-pocket spending in the
doughnut hole. Nevertheless, the model includes all three variables, instead of
only average out-of-pocket spending, for two reasons. First, as shown in section
(6.1), deductible and gap coverage are significant premium determinants, even
in the presence of the simulated plan cost variable. This suggests that deductible
and gap coverage variables have hedonic valuations that are independent of the
simulated generosity measure. In addition, there is evidence in the literature that
Part D enrollees are more responsive to plan features that are simple and easy to
observe, compared to measures that are complex but more objective (Abaluck and
Gruber (2009)).
The average out-of-pocket spending measure reflects drug pricing behavior by the
plan along with the design features of its formulary, such as the list of medications
covered, the tier structure, and cost-sharing arrangement. Plans negotiate with
pharmacies the prices their enrollees pay for covered medications before reaching
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the deductible and while in the doughnut hole. Those prices also determine the
amount to be paid as co-insurance. Two plans with the exact same formulary can
have different average out-of-pocket spending if they charge different drug prices.
The plan charging lower prices will have lower out-of-pocket costs. The capturing
of this drug-pricing dimension of generosity is an important advantage of using the
simulated out-of-pocket spending measure, as it can not be captured using measures
that only account for formulary design features.
Out-of-pocket spending can be viewed as a component of the overall price that an
enrollee expects to pay by joining a plan. This would suggest restricting its coefficient
(βoop) to be equal to the coefficient on premium (α), since both reflect the same
marginal utility of income. This is a reasonable restriction if the model estimated is
based on individual-level data. In our model, however, the out-of-pocket spending
measure is a plan-level variable that reflects the average expected spending for a
standardized population. Some of the enrollees may expect to have out-of-pocket
spending that is lower or higher than this average. For such enrollees, an additional
dollar in average out-of-pocket costs does not translate into an additional dollar
in expected spending for them. Enrollees healthier than average should expect to
pay less than the marginal increase in average out-of-pocket spending, whereas sick
enrollees should expect to pay more. On the other hand, an additional dollar in a
plan’s premium means an additional dollar in spending for any enrollee joining that
plan.
The coefficients on the two variables, therefore, reflect different economic quan-
tities. The coefficient on premium reflects the average marginal utility of income for
Part D enrollees. The coefficient on average out-of-pocket, on the other hand, reflects
the average of the interaction between an enrollee’s marginal utility of income
(αi) and her marginal increase in expected out-of-pocket spending resulting from
a one-dollar increase in the average out-of-pocket spending (γi). The distribution
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of this interaction term need not have the same mean as that of the distribution of
(αi). In fact, if we assume that αi and γi are normally and jointly distributed, with
means α and γ and standard deviations σα and σγ and correlation parameter ρ , then
Aroian (1947) shows that the mean of the product of the random variables is given
by:
βoop = µαγ = α ∗ γ +ρ ∗σα ∗σγ (6.1)
If we assume that γ is 1 and ρ is positive, meaning that health and wealth are
positively correlated, then βoop should be smaller than α in absolute value. There-
fore, the marginal effects of premium and average out-of-pocket spending should
not be restricted to be equal.
The characteristics included in the logit and nested-logit models of table (6.3)
constitute an incomplete list of the features that enrollees consider when choosing
among available Part D plans. There are additional characteristics that are observed
by the econometrician but are omitted for the sake of simplicity and tractability, e.g.
details of a plan’s network of pharmacies. Other plan features are not observed by
the econometrician, such as the quality of marketing and customer service. If these
omitted and unobserved features are the same for all the plans offered by a certain
insurer in all the regions, then the inclusion of an insurer fixed effect will be enough
to capture those variables.
However, it is likely that features of plans offered by one insurer will vary from
region to region and from plan to plan within the same region. For instance, many
insurers use different formularies for their basic and enhanced plans, and may use
different pharmacy networks for the same plan in different regions. The error term
in the logit and nested-logit specifications, therefore, incorporate plan-region devia-
tions from the mean valuation captured by the insurer fixed effect. In an oligopolistic
market, such as that of Part D, price is a function of marginal cost and a markup
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term that is a function of demand elasticity (Berry (1994)). Thus, premium is
correlated with any product characteristic that influences demand, making premium
potentially endogenous in any specification with omitted and unobserved demand
factors. The linearized nested-logit model includes log of within-nest share defined
as the share of a plan among other plans with the same benefit type. This variable
is also endogenous, as it is simultaneously determined with the log of plan share,
which is part of the dependent variable. To obtain consistent estimates, therefore,
we need to overcome the endogeneity problem of these two variables through the
use of valid and relevant instruments.
Specifications (2-4) in table (6.3) use instruments for premium and the log of
within-nest share that are similar to those used by Lucarelli et al. (2008) (see chapter
(4). The first-stage specification tests for the instruments are shown in Table (6.3).
The minimum eigen value test is the test of choice for instrument weakness when
the model has multiple endogenous variables and there are more than one first-stage
F statistic (Stock and Yogo (2005)). The test provides the minimum eigen value of a
matrix analog of the first-stage F statistic, and is equivalent to the F statistic when
there is only one endogenous variable. Stock and Yogo (2005) provide critical values
based on the tolerance for estimation bias resulting from the use of instruments
relative to the bias resulting from the use of the endogenous variables. A test statistic
larger than the critical value corresponding to a certain tolerance level indicates
that relative bias is smaller than that level of tolerance. The minimum eigen value
statistics for both the IV logit and IV nested-logit models are larger than the critical
values for a 10% level of relative bias, indicating that the instruments are reasonably
strong.
The use of instruments is expected to increase the absolute value of the coefficient
on premium. The omitted and unobserved variables described above are mostly
quality indicators that are positively correlated with premium. Without instruments,
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the marginal change in premium reflects not only an increment in price but also a
corresponding increase in quality, resulting in estimate of price sensitivity that are
biased towards zero. The other variables in the model are correlated with premium.
Hence, instrumenting for premium is expected to correct the bias in their coefficients
that results from the endogeneity of premium. The direction of this correction,
however, is difficult to predict.
The estimates in table (6.3) are in line with expectations. The coefficient on
premium is larger, in absolute value, in both specifications (2) and (3). The increase
is greater in specification (3) which includes region fixed effects. This effect of con-
trolling for region indicates the importance of controlling for region demographics,
and is one of the motivators of using the full model described in chapter (4). The
coefficient on gap coverage also increases in magnitude and becomes statistically
significant.
The coefficient on average out-of-pocket spending is negative and significant and
does not change much with the use of instruments. The magnitude of this coefficient
is significantly smaller in absolute value than that of the coefficient on premium. For
Part D enrollees, a $1 increase in a plan’s premium is equivalent, on average, to $2.6
increase in this plan’s average out-of-pocket spending. This estimate is consistent
with the result in equation (6.1).
The significance of the coefficients on deductible and gap coverage, while ac-
counting for average out-of-pocket spending, could be interpreted as evidence that
beneficiaries pay disproportionate attention to plan features that are familiar and
easy to understand, compared to features that are more difficult to obtain and
interpret (Abaluck and Gruber (2009), Heiss et al. (2010)).
Specification (4) is a nested-logit model where plans are grouped according to
type of benefit into basic plans and enhanced plans. Sigma, the coefficient on the
log of within-nest share, is significant, indicating that the logit specification should
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be rejected in favor of the nested-logit specification. The value of sigma indicates
a high level of correlation among the idiosyncratic taste shocks for plans of the
same benefit type. This correlation reflects the appeal of plans within the same
nest to consumers with similar characteristics, which motivates the use of demand
models that incorporate interactions between consumer and plan characteristics.
The coefficients on plan features from this IV nested-logit model are qualitatively
and quantitatively similar to those from the IV logit model.
A good proportion of the fixed effects for regions and contracts are statistically
significant. There are 71 contracts in the dataset, 28 of which have fixed effects
that are significantly different from the reference contract. This indicates that Part
D plans are differentiated along dimensions beyond those considered in the model.
Of the 34 PDP regions, 23 had fixed effects that are significantly different from the
reference region. This suggests that alternative coverage options do vary from region
to region.
To give an economic interpretation to the magnitudes of coefficients, I use the
estimates from specification 4 to quantify the value of different plan features to Part
D enrollees. I compute willingness-to-pay (WTP) measures by dividing parameter
estimates by the estimate of the marginal utility of income. The model uses monthly
premium; therefore, the coefficient on premium reflects the marginal utility from
a dollar in a month. To get an estimate of the willingness to pay for a year of a
particular benefit we need to multiply this monthly willingness-pay measure by 12.
Including average out-of-pocket spending in the model complicates the derivation
of the value of lower deductible and gap coverage, because the three measures are
correlated. To compute the correct willingness-to-pay, we need to use the marginal
effect of deductible and gap coverage, instead of coefficient estimates. However,
estimating marginal effects requires the knowledge of the exact mathematical rela-
tion between these variables and average out-of-pocket spending, which does not
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exist since the benefit design and generosity vary widely from one plan to the other.
Instead, we could use, as an approximation, the statistical relation that exists in the
data between deductible, gap coverage, and average out-of-pocket spending. To that
end, I use an OLS model regressing average out-of-pocket spending on deductible
and gap coverage, controling for premium, organization, and PDP region. A one
dollar increase in deductible increases out-of-pocket spending by 54 cents in a year,
and gap coverage reduces out-of-pocket spending by around $25, controlling for all
the other variables included in the demand model.
Using these estimates of marginal effects, I find that non-LIS enrollees are willing
to pay around $139 (in 2009 dollars) per year to go from a deductible of $295 to no
deductible. This is a surprisingly low estimate given that the majority of Medicare
beneficiaries are likely to have annual drug expenditures that are higher than $295.
Moeller et al. (2004) estimate that the average Medicare beneficiary spent $113 per
month on prescription drugs. The overwhelming majority (88%) of the sample I
use have simulated annual out-of-pocket spending that is greater than $295. The
reduction should be worth at least $295 to such enrollees, since it will reduce their
expected out-of-pocket spending by at least as much. Frakt and Pizer (2010) demand
estimates entail a higher value of $230 (in 2007 dollars, equivalent to $239 in 2009
dollars) for a $295 dollar reduction in premium. Their model, however, instruments
only for premium while including an indicator for low-income-subsidy plans, which
is a function of premium. The potential endogeneity of this indicator variable could
affect the consistency of all the other coefficients. Both estimates, nevertheless, are
significantly higher than the one provided by Lucarelli et al. (2008), who report a
valuation of $46 (in 2006 dollars, equivalent to $49 in 2009 dollars) per year for the
elimination of a $250 deductible. This is not surprising given their model’s inclusion
of LIS beneficiaries who should have a willingness-to-pay of zero since the subsidy
covers their deductible payments.
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Gap coverage is valued by non-LIS Part D enrollees at around $259 per year. To
gauge the reasonableness of this estimate, I compare it to an estimate of the average
savings from gap coverage using simulations of out-of-pocket spending. For each
Medicare beneficiary in the simulation sample, I compute her average out-of-pocket
spending for plans providing gap coverage in her region and compare that to her
average out-of-pocket spending for plans with no gap coverage. On average, gap
coverage results in $286 of savings for Medicare beneficiaries. This is close to the
WTP estimate, as well as to the $250 rebate amount that beneficiaries will receive in
2010 for expenditures in the gap as part of the new health reform legislation.
I also compare the estimate of WTP for gap coverage to the average market price
of gap coverage, adjusted for other plan features and insurer and region dummies.
To compute the adjusted average price for gap coverage, I run a hedonic regression
similar to the one in table 6.1 using 2009 data. The average annual price for gap
coverage using this measure is around $348, which is significantly higher than what
the average non-LIS enrollees is willing to pay for this feature. Heiss et al. (2010)
find hedonic prices for plan features in 2006 that approximate consumers’ willing-
ness to pay. The discrepancy I find using 2009 data could be related to what appears
to be a death spiral involving plans with generous benefits. There has been a gradual
disappearance over the first 4 years of the program of plans offering coverage in the
doughnut hole. Winter et al. (2006) report evidence of significant adverse selection
into generous plans, and Heiss et al. (2008) estimated that the government will
have to increase its subsidy to plans by 16% to preserve consumer choice in plan
generosity. If this disappearance is due to adverse selection, with sick enrollees
selecting into plans with gap coverage, then plans will have to charge a price for this
feature that is higher than its average valuation.
Table (6.3) also shows estimates of the median price elasticity of demand for





(1− σ̂) (1− σ̂ sharepr/G − (1− σ̂)sharepr)Ppr (6.2)
where α̂ and σ̂ are the estimates of the coefficients on premium and the log
of within-nest share, respectively. The use of instrumental variables increases the
estimate of elasticity from -1.47 to -2.39. The 95% confidence interval for the esti-
mate from the IV nested-logit model is [-3.04,-1.42]. The standard error for median
elasticity is computed using a parametric bootstrap approach (Horowitz (2001)).
I use the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the nested-logit coefficients to
draw a large sample from the asymptotic distribution of the coefficients. For each
draw, I obtain premium elasticity of demand for each plan and computed the median
elasticity for the draw. I then compute the mean and standard deviation of the
resulting distribution of median elasticity.
My elasticity estimates are considerably larger than estimates reported in the
literature for the elasticity of demand for Medicare HMOs, and are on the higher side
of the range reported in previous studies of demand for Part D plans (see chapter 3).
All the elasticity estimates for Part D plans reported in the literature are significantly
larger compared to those for Medicare HMOs. Frakt and Pizer (2010) discuss two
potential reasons for this. First, Part D plans are easier to establish compared to
Medicare HMOs, which require the development of a network of hospitals and
physicians in addition to the arrangements with drug manufacturers and pharmacy
networks for the prescription drug benefit. The smaller fixed costs stimulate entry
into the market, leading to the availability to beneficiaries of more substitutes, and
consequently to larger premium elasticity of demand. Second, unlike Medicare
HMOs which have been offered for more than two decades, Part D plans have been
around for only a few years. To the extent that beneficiaries become attached to the
plans they enroll-in and face switching costs, the impact of premiums on plan choice
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will be less the more significant such attachment is.
There are two potential reasons why the elasticity estimates I report in this
research are higher than those reported in previous studies of demand for Part D
plans. First, previous studies used data from 2006 or 2007, while I use 2009 data.
This time difference is likely to be of significance. There is evidence of significant
learning by consumers early in the program in terms of how to navigate the market
maze and choose plans that best suit their needs (Ketcham et al. (2010)). The early
few years have also seen considerable changes in the number, type, and price of
Part D plan offerings, which suggests that insurers were also learning about this
new market. To the extent that this learning enables market actors to make more
optimal choices, then studies imposing a rational model of behavior would be less
mistaken if applied to later years. In addition to this model validity issue, learning
by consumers is bound to affect their actual choices. In particular, as consumers
become more adept at comparing plans’ premiums and features, their demand will
become more elastic with regards to these characteristics, especially to premiums
which are the most salient and easy to understand of all plan features. This is what
the estimates in this study suggest.
We can use our elasticity estimate to compute the probability of plan switch-
ing given an increase in premium. The probability of switching associated with a
change in the premium is the change in the plans market share due to the change in














The probability of a non-LIS part D enrollee switching plans increases by 5.8%
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for each dollar increase in premium. Similar to elasticity, this estimate is significantly
higher than 0.002 and 0.016 reported for Medicare HMOs by Buchmueller (2000)
and Dowd et al. (2003), respectively.
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Table 6.3: Logit and Nested Logit Demand Estimates for Non-LIS Enrollees
Variable 1 2 3 4
Intercept −1.5 0.59 2.30 −0.88
(0.82) (1.26) (1.20) (0.42)
Premium −0.033∗∗ −0.063∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.02∗∗
(0.003) (0.012) (0.01) (0.004)
Deductible −0.0018∗∗ −0.0026∗∗ −0.0031∗∗ −0.0004
(0.0004) (0.005) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Gap Coverage −0.1 0.86∗ 1.44∗∗ 0.23∗
(0.13) (0.39) (0.36) (0.11)
Avg OOP −0.019∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.008∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
Sigma 0.63∗∗
(0.04)
Median Elasticity -1.28 -1.8 -2.39 -2.25
(0.13) (0.34) (0.34) (0.44)
Fixed Effects Contract Contract Contract, Contract,
Region Region
Instruments None BLP BLP BLP
Minimum Eigen Value 18.6 19.2 12.8
CV for 10% 2SLS Relative Bias 11.1 11.1 9.5
Over Identification Test 40.6 31.5 66.6
a Based on 1612 observations. Dependent variable is ln(S jt)− ln(S0t). Includes region and
organization fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors for
median elasticity derived using parametric bootstrap with 1000 draws.
Significance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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6.3 The Full Model
The estimates of the full model are based on equation (4.2) and were derived using
the procedure described in chapter (??). I use the empirical distribution of demo-
graphics to compute predicted market shares, along with draws from a standard
normal distribution for unobserved individual heterogeneity. For each PDP region,
I simulate 120 individuals and compute predicted market shares as the numerical
approximation of the integral in equation (4.8). The instruments for premium are
the same as those used in the IV logit and IV nested-logit models. The number of
instruments exceeds the number of exclusion restrictions required to identify the
model, leading to an over-identified GMM system that is solved by minimizing the
weighted sum of moments specified in equation (4.14).
Table (6.4) shows the full model demand estimates for non-LIS enrollees. Plan
features used in the model include premium, deductible, gap coverage, and average
out-of-pocket spending. The demographic variable used in the model is medical
expenditures, measured by how much Medicare paid on behalf of the individual
for inpatient and outpatient care. The measure is obtained from MCBS 2006 and
2007 Access to Care modules, and is adjusted to account for the influence of supple-
mentary health insurance (Atherly (2002)). I excluded expenditures on prescription
drugs because they reflect choices beneficiaries made with regards to prescription
drug coverage.
The model also includes organization fixed effects to account for unobserved
insurer-level features. Unlike the IV logit and IV nested-logit specifications presented
above, however, the full model does not include region fixed effects. Interac-
tion parameters are identified by between-market variation in the distribution of
demographics and by variation in choice sets (Nevo (2001)). The inclusion of re-
gion fixed-effects will capture most of that variation, limiting the identifiability of
interaction terms.
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Interactions with medical expenditures in the preferred specification of the model
are limited to those with the intercept, premium, deductible, and average out-of-
pocket variables. The restrictions were chosen to minimize the effect of correlation
between the various measures of plan generosity. Such correlation would limit
identification of interaction parameters, especially given the limited variation in the
distribution of demographics between regions in a single year.
The mean coefficient on premium is larger in absolute value compared to the IV
logit and IV nested-logit models, resulting in the higher elasticity estimate of -5.04.
This is due to the fact that the full model controls for variables that the linearized
logit and nested-logit models cannot incorporate because they assume homogenous
parameters. The full model controls for interactions between plan characteristics and
demographics, and it accounts for unobserved plan characteristics. The inclusion
of these variables in the full model corrects the missing variable bias in the IV logit
and nested-logit estimates, and resolves the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
problem of the logit model in manner that is richer and more flexible than the
nested-logit model. The mean coefficients on the other variables are also larger
in absolute value, reflecting the correction of the attenuation bias in the logit and
nested-logit estimates.
I compute willingness-to-pay estimates based on the results in table (6.4) using
the same approach discussed in section (6.2). The magnitude of the mean coefficient
on deductible suggests that, on average, Part D enrollees value a reduction in annual
deductible from $295 to $0 at approximately $334. This is significantly higher, and
more reasonable, compared to the nested-logit estimate. The value of gap coverage
also increases to $273 per year, which is still significantly smaller than the $348
implicit price of this feature.
Estimates of the interaction parameters are significant and of the expected sign.
Beneficiaries with high inpatient and outpatient expenditures are likely to have
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higher drug expenditures as well. The estimates suggest that they are less sensitive
to plan premium and deductible than those with good health. This is an intuitive
result, since for any benefit package, enrollees with poor health expect to receive
more benefits, in absolute dollar amounts, compared to those with good health, and
would, as a result, be willing to pay more. Controlling for premium and deductible,
enrollees with high medical expenditures are more sensitive to plan generosity, as
measured by average-out-of-pocket spending, reflecting their higher drug expendi-
tures. Interactions with unobserved individual tastes are not significant, controlling
for interactions with medical expenditures. The limited variation in the distribution
of demographics in addition to the similarities in choice sets in different PDP regions
makes it difficult to identify all of these parameters using data from a single year.
Interactions of premium and deductible with medical expenditures are positive
despite the potential correlation between bad health and low income. It is possible
that the random heterogeneity controls for the distribution of income in the region.
If this is not the case, then controlling for income directly would probably make the
estimates of these interactions even more positive.
Table (6.5) shows the distribution of parameter heterogeneity implied by the
full model estimates. The distributions are driven by the empirical distribution of
medical expenditures of non-LIS beneficiaries, which is heavily skewed to the left.
More than 95% of non-LIS beneficiaries are predicted to have premium coefficients
that are less than zero. The positive premium coefficients belong to individuals in
the sample with medical expenditures that are extraordinarily high. Corresponding
drug expenditures are likely to be in the catastrophic coverage zone, of which the
enrollee pays only 5%. The model does not account for this non-linear nature of
the interaction, resulting in unrealistic predictions away from the center of the
distribution. The same could be said about the distribution of the parameters on
deductible and average out-of-pocket spending.
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For instance, sensitivity to a marginal increase in deductible should go down as
drug expenditures increase towards the maximum deductible offered in the market.
If expected out-of-pocket spending is more than this maximum deductible then the
marginal sensitivity should go to zero, as any increase in deductible that does not
exceed the maximum do not affect such enrollees. Therefore, the mean estimate in
table (6.4) probably reflects more the preferences of those on the left side of the
distribution of medical expenditures, and less those in its right tail.
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Table 6.4: Full Model Estimates for Non-LIS Enrollees
Variable Means Standard Medical
Deviations Expenditure
β σ π
Intercept 0.98 2.29 −0.81
(2.29) (1.30) (1.66)
Premium −0.13∗∗ 0.016 0.050∗∗
(0.02) (0.023) (0.016)
Deductible −0.011∗∗ 0.002 0.013∗∗
(0.001) (0.004) (0.005)
Gap Coverage 2.21∗∗ 0 0
(0.65) 0 0





a Based on 1269 observations. Medical expenditures in thousands per
month. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors for
median elasticity derived using parametric bootstrap with 1000 draws.
Significance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6.5: Parameter Heterogeneity
αi βDeduct−i βoop−i Medical Expenditure
($ per month)
Mean −0.11 −0.005 −0.032 460
Median −0.12 −0.009 −0.026 80
95% −0.008 0.02 −0.64 2,400
Max 0.96 0.27 −0.37 21,800
a Based on a combined sample of 15532 of non-LIS beneficiaries from MCBS 2006
and 2007 Access to Care modules. Ranking in terms of absolute value. The





7.1 Low Income Subsidy Recepients and Preferences
for Part D Plans
Medicare Part D provides substantial assistance to enrollees with low income. This
subsidy is vital component of the program, providing coverage to millions of seniors
with limited financial resources. More than 9.5 million beneficiaries received the
low-income subsidy (LIS) in 2009, 8.1 million of whom were dual eligibles and other
beneficiaries who were automatically deemed eligible for the subsidy (The Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation (2009)). The remaining 1.5 million applied and qualified
for the subsidy. The subsidy pays for the premium, the deductible, and for coverage
in the doughnut hole, while beneficiaries pay only small copayments for generic
and brand drugs covered by the plan. In addition to copayments, LIS recipients
have to pay for medications that are not on their plan’s formulary. The premium
subsidy is limited to a benchmark determined by a weighted average of premiums in
the region. If the beneficiary chooses to enroll in a plan with a premium above the
benchmark, she would have to pay the balance.
CMS auto-enrolls beneficiaries who qualify for LIS into plans that charge pre-
miums below the region benchmark. The purpose of this auto-enrollment is to
guarantee continuity of coverage for this vulnerable population. There is widespread
belief among policy makers and advocacy groups that a significant proportion of this
population will fail to sign up for Part D coverage, in a timely fashion, if not assisted
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(Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2007)). This is especially
true for new dual eligibles who qualify for Medicare after turning 65 and loosing
Medicaid coverage as a result. LIS beneficiaries, however, can choose a different
plan if they are not satisfied with their assignment. In fact, open enrollment for LIS
beneficiaries continues throughout the year, and they can switch plans whenever
they desire. This is another protective arrangement, to give beneficiaries the chance
to change plans if the formulary or pricing in their current plan changes or if they
require new drugs that are not covered by their current plan.
Data on plan choices by LIS beneficiaries are limited, but there is evidence from
surveys of beneficiaries and advocates working with seniors that many LIS enrollees
remain in the plans to which they were initially assigned. For instance, in a survey
of individuals who assist Medicare beneficiaries, Summer et al. (2008) report that
three quarters of respondents said that few or none of the dual eligible beneficia-
ries they see were aware that they had the right to switch plans anytime. Around
35% of respondents to that survey said that, very often or often, those who were
auto-enrolled had difficulty switching plans.
There is also an indirect evidence from CMS reports on the number of LIS ben-
eficiaries who are reassigned to new plans each year. LIS enrollees in plans that
raise premiums above the benchmark in a subsequent year are automatically reas-
signed to another LIS plan in their region. This is true for those who did not switch
plans after the initial assignment. Enrollees who have switched previously receive
notification by their plan and by CMS that they have to choose another benchmark
plan if they want to avoid paying any premium. CMS reports that 1.2 million LIS
beneficiaries were reassigned to new plans in 2010, while 2.2 million were notified
to choose a new plan. This means that 3.4 million LIS beneficiaries were enrolled
in plans that raised premiums above the benchmark in 2010 (The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation (2009)). Out of those, 2.2 million have switched plans previously,
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otherwise they would have been reassigned and not just notified. If we assume that
those 3.4 million beneficiaries are representative of the other LIS enrollees, then it is
reasonable to conclude that at least 30% of LIS beneficiaries end up staying in their
assigned plans for the entirety of the year. A higher percentage would have spent
some time during the year in the assigned plan, especially given the reports on the
difficulty of switching plans and the lack of awareness on the part of beneficiaries of
the option to switch.
Therefore, at least some LIS beneficiaries do exercise their option to switch to a
different Part D plan. In principle, we could use enrollment patterns corresponding to
such active choosers to estimate preferences of LIS beneficiaries. However, plan-level
LIS enrollment data do not distinguish between LIS beneficiaries making active plan
choices and those randomly assigned. Nonetheless, random assignment is limited
to plans that qualify to enroll LIS beneficiaries. Therefore, those LIS beneficiaries
enrolled in non-LIS plans are, by definition, active choosers. The full subsidy for
those beneficiaries covers the benchmark premium, deductible, and the cost sharing
corresponding to the basic part of the plan’s benefit. The LIS enrollee is responsible
for the share of the premium above the benchmark level, and for any cost-sharing
corresponding to the enhanced part of the benefit.
It is possible, therefore, to use LIS enrollment in non-LIS plans to estimate pref-
erences for LIS beneficiaries who are active choosers. Choosing a non-benchmark
plan entails extra out-of-pocket spending. Hence it is reasonable to expect that
the population of LIS beneficiaries who choose to enroll in such plans are probably
more well-to-do compared to those that choose a benchmark plan. Nevertheless, the
differences are unlikely to be significant since both groups have incomes close to or
below the poverty line.
Reviewing trends in plan enrollment over the period 2008-2009 reveals another
issue that could be of concern. There is significant stickiness in enrollment by LIS
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beneficiaries into LIS plans, such that when plans cease to be LIS plans they still
retain a significant LIS enrollment. This stickiness may be considered a sign of a
passive enrollment as opposed to active choice by LIS enrollees that remain enrolled
in these plans. However, CMS automatically reassigns beneficiaries auto-enrolled
in such plans to other LIS plans. Therefore, those that remain in LIS plans after
they lost their benchmark status must have actively chosen to remain enrolled. The
exception are those LIS beneficiaries that actively chose to enroll in the plan initially.
CMS does not reassign such active choosers automatically. They are informed of the
change in the status of their plan, and encouraged to consider switching to another
plan if they want to pay no premium. But those have at least shown preference to
the plan at some point.
Since I have no data on active choosers enrolling in LIS plans, I consider PDP LIS
plans as part of the outside option (together with LIS MAPD plans) and model only
the choice of non-LIS PDP plans by LIS beneficiaries. I use the model described in
section (6.2) with the same variables and instruments. Table (7.1) presents results
from IV logit estimation of this model, and compares those to the IV logit demand
estimates for non-LIS enrollees. The premium for LIS enrollees is computed as the
difference between a plan’s premium and the region’s benchmark level. The model
does not include the deductible because the subsidy covers the deductible for LIS
enrollees even in non-benchmark plans.
The coefficient on premium is larger in absolute value for LIS enrollees, reflect-
ing their lower income which is associated with larger marginal utility of income.
Median elasticity, however, is similar for both groups. This is primarily because of
the lower premiums paid by LIS enrollees. These elasticity estimates are in effect
taken at different points along the demand curve of each group. Therefore, given
our assumed linear utility representation, if both groups had the same coefficient
on premium, LIS beneficiaries would have had a smaller elasticity estimate. LIS
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beneficiaries are also significantly more responsive to measures of plan generosity.
Table 7.1: IV Logit Estimates for Non-LIS and LIS Enrollees





Avg OOP −0.028∗∗ −0.050∗∗
(0.005) (0.007)
N 1522 1335
Median Elasticity −2.98 −2.80
(0.38) (0.47)
Minimum Eigen Value 19.2 10.76
CV for 10% 2SLS Relative Bias 11.1 10.27
Over Identification Test 31.5 14.04
a Dependent variable is ln(S jt)− ln(S0t). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Standard errors for median elasticity derived using
parametric bootstrap with 1000 draws.
Significance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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7.2 Potential Savings and Welfare Gains from Strate-
gic Enrollment
Medicare beneficiaries eligible for full low-income subsidy are randomly assigned by
CMS to an LIS plan in their region. This random assignment, however, does not take
into account each beneficiary’s medication profile. This is potentially problematic
for these beneficiaries, especially given the degree of variation between plans in
the drugs they cover. In a 2006 survey conducted by the office of the inspector
general of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), only half
of the drugs commonly used by Medicaid eligible enrollees were included by all
the formularies of Part D plans surveyed (Office of the Inspector General (2006)).
Summer et al. (2008) report that more than one-third of beneficiary contacts they
surveyed reported that, often and very often, drugs needed by their clients were not
on their plans’ formularies.
LIS recipients assigned to plans that do not cover their drugs will have to pay for
those drugs out-of-pocket. This imposes significant financial hardship on these en-
rollees. LIS beneficiaries, however, have two potential remedies for this unfortunate
situation. They could switch to a different Part D plan that covers their medication
any time during the year. Alternatively, they could file a request with their plan to
cover their medication. Both options require significant awareness and familiarity
with the workings of the program that many LIS enrollees may not have (Summer
et al. (2008)).
The indirect evidence we have on the proportion of LIS beneficiaries who switch
plans indicate that at least 30% of beneficiaries stay in their assigned plans for the
whole year. Those could well be the beneficiaries for whom random assignment
resulted in a plan that matches their needs. However, reports from the field suggest
that a significant number of assigned beneficiaries lack coverage for at least some
of their medications, and have difficulty switching to another plan. But even if
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these enrollees eventually switched plans, the process can potentially take weeks
or months to complete, during which they had to pay for their uncovered drugs
out-of-pocket or forgo taking them altogether (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and
the Uninsured (2007)).
Many analysts and beneficiary advocates, therefore, recommended reconsidering
the random assignment process. An intuitive alternative suggested by many is for
CMS to use claims data to match each LIS enrollee to the plan that best fits her need
(Summer et al. (2008), Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2007)).
For those with no prior data, such as MSP beneficiaries or recent Medicaid eligibles,
random assignment will need to be used for the first several months.
CMS has recently undertaken a study to analyze this strategic assignment pro-
posal and to measure its value relative to random assignment (Center for Medicaid
and Medicare Services (2009)). Random assignment was found to result in an
optimal match for two thirds of reassigned enrollees. A plan is considered optimal if
it covers the maximum number of enrollees’ drugs compared to other benchmark
plans in the region. The remaining one third would benefit from strategic reassign-
ment. Strategic assignment was found to be especially useful to those using drugs
that are not in a protected class. Their analysis, however, relies on estimating drug
match rates, and does not quantify the consequences of mismatches in terms of
out-of-pocket spending.
The analysis in this section evaluates the benefit from strategic assignment using
two different approaches. First, I use plan drug pricing data, in addition to plan
formularies and drug profiles for a representative sample of LIS enrollees from 2006
MCBS Cost and Use module, to simulate enrollees’ expected out-of-pocket spending
associated with each benchmark plan in their region. I then use the out-of-pocket
simulations to quantify the potential savings from strategic assignments. Second, I
use parameter estimates from the analysis of demand by LIS beneficiaries in section
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(7.1), and a modified version of the parameter estimates from the full model of
demand by non-LIS beneficiaries, to estimate potential welfare gains from strategic
assignment. Both evaluations are reported for a period of one month, which is
arguably the minimum period a beneficiary would stay in an assigned plan before
switching to their optimal plan.
Table (7.2) shows estimates of the potential savings from assigning LIS beneficia-
ries to plans that minimize their out-of-pocket spending, compared to assignment to
plans with average out-of-pocket spending, representing random assignment. On
average, LIS beneficiaries stand to save around $122 per month if they were assigned
to a plan that best covers their medication, with total potential savings of around
$0.6 billion per month. The range of potential savings is quite large, with some LIS
beneficiaries saving up to $954. Table (7.3) shows the effect of health status on
potential savings from strategic assignment. As expected, potential savings increase
as health status worsens.
Savings, however, do not capture all sources of utility for consumers. Enrollees
have tastes for other plan attributes, besides proxies for out-of-pocket expenditures,
such as the quality of customer service, the structure of pharmacy networks, and the
nature of utilization management practices. Therefore, using utility estimates to eval-
uate strategic assignment is perhaps more informative than using potential savings.
The utility from plan characteristics could be estimated using demand models similar
to the one presented in section (7.1). In such models, the utility from non-monetary
features is captured by insurer fixed effects. However, this model of demand does not
allow for interaction between plan features and individual characteristics. Therefore,
the estimates from the model cannot be used alone to evaluate a beneficiary’s utility
from each available benchmark plan in order to determine her optimal choice.
I attempt to overcome this problem by making use of the estimates from section
(6.3) for non-LIS enrollees, combined with the sensible conclusion from section
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(7.1) that LIS beneficiaries are more sensitive than their non-LIS counterparts to
out-of-pocket costs. I use demand estimates for LIS enrollees from section (7.1),
including insurer fixed effects, to estimate mean utility for each plan. For the inter-
action between plan features and medical expenditures, I use estimates from the full
model for non-LIS enrollees. Premiums and deductibles of all benchmark plans are
effectively zero for all enrollees. Therefore, the only interaction left is that between
average out-of-pocket spending and medical expenditures.
The use of estimates for interaction parameters from the non-LIS model will not
generate an accurate point estimate. However, it can conceivably provide a lower-
bound estimate of the welfare gains to LIS enrollees from strategic assignments. If
LIS beneficiaries are more sensitive to out-of-pocket costs, then LIS beneficiaries with
high medical and drug expenditures should be more sensitive to a plan’s average
out-of-pocket spending than non-LIS enrollees with similar levels of expenditures.
Nonetheless, combining coefficients from two different models to generate an
estimate may raise concerns. In particular, evaluating the uncertainty of the estimate
using standard error from two separate models is problematic. For the parametric
bootstrap, for instance, I draw from the asymptotic joint distribution of all the
parameters used to generate the estimate of interest. The joint distribution, however,
entails covariances between parameter estimates that could not be assessed when
these estimates come from different models. To address this concern, I restrict to
zero all covariances between parameters. This should have the effect of increasing
the uncertainty around my welfare estimate, resulting in conservative standard
errors.
Table (7.4) shows results from this estimation exercise. Welfare gain for an LIS
beneficiary is computed as the difference in expected utility between his maximum
plan utility and average plan utility, divided by average marginal utility of income for
LIS beneficiaries. Strategic assignment is estimated to lead to an average monthly
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welfare gain of $58, with a total welfare gain of $0.47 billion in one month. The
estimates are lower than the estimates of potential savings. This is probably a result
of using interaction coefficient from the model for non-LIS enrollees. In addition,
savings reflect primarily the listing of beneficiaries’ drugs on plan’s formularies. Plans
with expansive formularies result in bigger savings. However, many such plans use
utilization management to limit use of those medications, which can limit utility
from joining them.
The estimated savings and welfare gains from strategic enrollment are potentially
significant. The analysis in this section suggests that LIS beneficiaries stand to gain
at least $58 worth of welfare each month if they were assigned to a plan that best
matches their needs. This is approximately equivalent to 30% of the average monthly
amount the government pays Part D plans to cover LIS beneficiaries (2.9).
Two caveats are in order, however. First, I assume that medication use is constant
over the period of comparison, which is a reasonable assumption for a one month
period, but is unlikely to be true for extended periods of time. For instance, Domino
et al. (2008) investigate the effect of changes in the use of medications by the end
of the year on out-of-pocket spending, conditional on the choice of the lowest cost
plan at the beginning of the year. They find that choosing a plan based on current
medications is associated with increases in annual out-of-pocket spending of around
$556 for 43% of their sample. The increases in out-of-pocket spending is due to
changes in the use of medications that were not considered for the initial choice.
They conclude that beneficiaries should consider the global generosity of plans,
instead of only focusing on coverage of the medications they currently use.
This is a valuable insight that needs to be incorporated in any attempt to improve
assignments of LIS beneficiaries. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the
comparison made by Domino et al. (2008) is different from the one made in this
analysis. The authors compare the ex post savings from strategic assignment to
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those from assignment to a plan that is ex post efficient, while this analysis compares
strategic assignment to random assignment. An ideal comparison, perhaps, would
be to compare the outcomes of both strategic assignment and random assignment to
the ex post efficient outcome.
Second, the analysis in this section is a partial equilibrium analysis that does not
consider the long-term outcomes of the strategic assignment process. In particular,
the analysis is based on static demand analysis that does not incorporate dynamics
or the supply side. Strategic assignment is likely to increase the potential for adverse
selection. LIS plans providing relatively generous coverage will attract LIS beneficia-
ries with above average costs. In return, plans will either try to limit their coverage
to select against costly enrollees, leading to a race to the bottom, or raise premium
and lose their benchmark status. The potential long-run outcome, in either case, is
not favorable to LIS beneficiaries. In the short and medium terms, any savings for
LIS beneficiaries will translate into higher government spending, which needs to be
considered in any analysis on the effect of the policy on overall societal welfare.





Total Savings (billions) $0.6
a Based on 2817 respondents from 2006 MCBS Access to
Care module who are LIS recipients and/or dual
eligibles. Sampling standard errors in parentheses.
Total savings computed using MCBS sampling weights.
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Table 7.3: Potential Monthly Savings from Strate-
gic Enrollment by Health Status
Health Status Coefficient Std. Error





a Based on 2523 respondents from 2006 MCBS Access to
Care module who are LIS recipients and/or dual
eligibles. Excellent health is the reference category.
Significance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 7.4: Potential Monthly Welfare Gains from
Strategic Enrollment
Average Welfare Gain $58.8
Std. Err (18.1)
Total Welfare Gain (billions) $0.473
Std. Err (0.003)
a Based on 2523 respondents from 2006 MCBS Access to
Care module who are LIS recipients. Total welfare gain
computed using MCBS sampling weights. Standard





This study adds to previous literature by estimating separate structural demand
systems for LIS beneficiaries and non-LIS enrollees. Several important results are
obtained. First, non-LIS enrollees are significantly more sensitive to premiums than
previously recognized. The estimate of elasticity of demand for non-LIS enrollees is
at least twice that reported in studies using earlier data. The difference could be ex-
plained, at least partially, by the nature of the data used for the estimation. However,
this finding could also be interpreted as evidence that consumers are becoming more
adept over time at choosing plans and navigating the market. Evidence from recent
studies in the literature supports this learning hypothesis (Ketcham et al. (2010)).
The analysis also shows that the average valuation of gap coverage by consumers
is below the implicit price of this coverage. I interpret this finding as evidence of
adverse selection into plans providing generous coverage. The number of plans
providing benefits in the doughnut hole has been falling consistently since 2007,
and many analysts attribute this gradual disappearance to adverse selection. If such
plans are disproportionately selected by enrollees with above-average costs, their
pricing will have to go up to match the high costs. This will lead at a certain point to
prices exceeding the benefit that an average beneficiary gets from the gap coverage,
which is what I find in this analysis.
However, the phasing in of coverage in the doughnut hole staring 2010 is likely
to reverse this dynamic. This new subsidy reduces costs to plans of providing com-
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prehensive coverage in the gap, and will encourage more beneficiaries to enroll in
plans providing such coverage. The resulting reduction in adverse selection, along
with the reduction in plan costs, will likely lead to lower prices for comprehensive
gap coverage in the future.
Examining parameter heterogeneity revealed a significant relationship between
sensitivity to out-of-pocket spending and level of medical care cost. Beneficiaries
with high inpatient and outpatient expenditures are likely to have higher drug expen-
ditures as well. The estimates suggest that they are less sensitive to plan premium
and deductible than those with good health. This is an intuitive result, since for
any benefit package, enrollees with poor health expect to receive more benefits, in
absolute dollar amounts, compared to those with good health, and would, as a result,
be willing to pay more. On the other hand, enrollees with high medical expendi-
tures are more sensitive to plan generosity (as measured by average-out-of-pocket
spending), reflecting their higher drug expenditures.
In addition to estimating demand for non-LIS beneficiaries, I utilize the data
on plan-level enrollment by LIS beneficiaries to estimate a demand system for LIS
beneficiaries who are active choosers. Specifically, I use the subset of LIS benefi-
ciaries that chose to enroll, or remain enrolled, in a non-LIS plan. I find that LIS
beneficiaries are significantly more sensitive to out-of-pocket expenditures compared
to non-LIS enrollees. This is likely due to their lower income and the corresponding
higher marginal utility of money. My sample is composed of LIS recipients who are
willing to pay a premium to join a non-LIS plan, which suggests that the average
LIS beneficiary who enrolls in an LIS plan is likely to be even more sensitive to
out-of-pocket spending.
The analysis finally examined the welfare gains to LIS beneficiaries from a policy
of strategic assignment compared to the current process of random assignment to
benchmark plans. I find evidence of significant welfare gains for LIS beneficiaries
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from assigning them to plans that best cover their medications. The lower bound
estimate of this gain is approximately equivalent to 30% of the average monthly
amount the government pays Part D plans to cover LIS beneficiaries. The long term
effects of such policy, however, could be unfavorable to LIS beneficiaries. Strategic
assignment is likely to increase the potential of adverse selection for LIS plans and
lead to a race to the bottom or exit of benchmark plans. Policy makers and regulators
will have to carefully weigh the significant short-term gains against the potential
long-run costs.
There are several limitations to the analysis that I hope to be able to address
in future research. First, the analysis is a partial equilibrium analysis that includes
only the demand side and does not model the behavior of insurers. This limits the
usefulness of the model in predicting the impact of policy changes that may elicit
significant firm responses, such as the implementation of a strategic assignment
policy.
Second, the use of market-level data to estimate individual heterogeneity requires
significant variation between markets in demographics and choice sets. Unfortu-
nately, both variations are limited if one uses data for Part D from a single year.
The incorporation of additional years of aggregate data, or combining aggregate
data with individual level data from the new Part D claims release, will significantly
add to the precision of the estimates and allow for a richer modeling of consumer
heterogeneity.
Finally, the estimation of welfare gains from strategic assignment focused on
finding a lower bound instead of a point estimate. The availability of additional data
on plan-level LIS enrollment in the future will allow for the estimation of a separate
random utility model for LIS beneficiaries.
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